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We introduce language-based games, in which utility is defined over descrip-
tions in a given language. By choosing the right language, we can capture psy-
chological games [9] and reference-dependent preference [15]. Of special inter-
est are languages that can express only coarse beliefs (e.g., the probability of
an event is “high” or “low”, rather than “the probability is .628”): by assuming
that a player’s preferences depend only on what is true in a coarse language, we
can resolve a number of well-known paradoxes in the literature, including the
Allais paradox. Despite the expressive power of this approach, we show that
it can describe games in a simple, natural way. Nash equilibrium and rational-
izability are generalized to this setting; Nash equilibrium is shown not to exist
in general, while the existence of rationalizable strategies is proved under mild
conditions on the language.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In a classical, normal-form game, an outcome is a tuple of strategies, one for
each player, and players’ preferences are formalized by utility functions defined
on the set of all such outcomes. This framework thereby hard-codes a single
conception of how players represent the world insofar as their preferences are
concerned.
The motivating idea of the present work is to relax this rigidity in a system-
atic way by using language as the foundation of preference. Roughly speaking,
we assume that what the players care about is captured by some underlying
language, with utility defined on descriptions in that language. Classical game
theory can be viewed as the special case where the underlying language can
talk only about outcomes. In general, however, the language can be as rich or
poor as desired.
In the colloquial sense of the word, the role of “language” in decision mak-
ing and preference formation can hardly be overstated. It is well known, for
example, that presenting alternative medical treatments in terms of survival
rates versus mortality rates can produce a marked difference in how those treat-
ments are evaluated, even by experienced physicians [18]. More generally, one
of the core insights of prospect theory [14]—that subjective value depends not
(only) on facts about the world but on how those facts are presented (as gains or
losses, dominated or undominated options, etc.)—can be viewed as a kind of
language-sensitivity. We celebrate 10th and 100th anniversaries specially, and
make a big deal when the Dow Jones Industrial Average crosses a multiple of
1,000, all because we happen to work in a base 10 number system (i.e., our lan-
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guage puts special emphasis on multiples of 10 that would be absent, for exam-
ple, in a hexadecimal system). Furthermore, we often assess likelihoods using
words like “probable”, “unlikely”, or “negligible”, rather than numeric repre-
sentations, and when numbers are used, we tend to round them [17]. Much of
the motivation and conceptual appeal of our approach stems from observations
like these: defining preferences in terms of language provides a direct avenue
for formalizing such intuitions about how people think.
Of special interest is the general phenomenon of coarseness or categoricity.
Theories of rational decision making are often couched in the formalism of con-
tinuous mathematics, but the world is not always a continuous place, at least
as far as preferences are concerned. Consumers tend to ignore, for example, the
difference in price between $3.98 and $3.99, but take seriously (or even exag-
gerate) the difference between $3.99 and $4.00 (cf. Example 3.0.1). Similarly,
although degrees of belief are often formalized using probability measures,
a coarser representation can be more appropriate for reasoning about human
choice and inference (see [19], [21], [17]). We show, for instance, that the Allais
paradox [1] can be resolved simply and intuitively when belief is represented
discretely, rather than on a continuum (Example 3.0.2).
Coarseness in the underlying language—cases where there are fewer de-
scriptions than there are actual differences to describe—provides a natural and
powerful way of capturing such phenomena, offering insight into a variety of
puzzles and paradoxes of human decision making. Moreover, it allows for a
unified analysis of coarseness as it pertains both to preferences and to beliefs,
traditionally distinct domains of decision making. This is accomplished using
languages expressive enough to talk about beliefs, a technique that is of interest
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in its own right.
Classically, beliefs are relevant to decision making insofar as they determine
expected utility. But beliefs can also themselves be considered as objects of pref-
erence: one might wish to model players who feel guilt, wish to surprise their
opponents, or are motivated by a desire to live up to what is expected of them.
Psychological game theory, beginning with the work of Geanakoplos, Pearce, and
Stachetti [9] and expanded by Battigalli and Duwfenberg [4], is an enrichment
of the classical setting meant to capture such preferences and motivations. In a
similar vein, the notion of reference-dependent preferences developed by Ko¨szegi
and Rabin [15], building on prospect theory, formalizes phenomena such as loss-
aversion by augmenting players’ preferences with an additional sense of gain
or loss derived by comparing the actual outcome to what was expected.
With the appropriate choice of language, our approach subsumes these: an
underlying language that includes beliefs allows us to capture psychological
games, while a language that distinguishes expected from actual outcomes al-
lows us to represent reference-dependent preferences. Moreover, in each of
these frameworks, modeling coarse beliefs provides insight and opportunities
lacking in the continuous setting. Much of this paper is an elaboration and jus-
tification of this point.
As a preliminary illustration of some of these ideas, consider the following
simple example.
Example 1.0.1: A surprise proposal. Alice and Bob have been dating for a while
now, and Bob has decided that the time is right to pop the big question. Though
he is not one for fancy proposals, he does want it to be a surprise. In fact, if Alice
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expects the proposal, Bob would prefer to postpone it entirely until such time
as it might be a surprise. Otherwise, if Alice is not expecting it, Bob’s preference
is to take the opportunity.
We might summarize this scenario by the following table of payoffs for Bob:
p ¬p
BA p 0 1
¬BA p 1 0
Table 1.1: The surprise proposal.
In this table, we denote Bob’s two strategies, proposing and not proposing, by
p and ¬p, respectively, and use BAp (respectively, ¬BAp) to denote that Alice
is expecting (respectively, not expecting) the proposal. Of course, whether or
not Alice expects a proposal may be more than a binary affair: she may, for
example, consider a proposal unlikely, somewhat likely, very likely, or certain.
But as we have discussed, there is good reason to think that an accurate model
of her expectations involves only a small number k of distinct “levels” of belief,
rather than a continuum. Table 1.1, for simplicity, assumes that k = 2, though
this is easily generalized to larger values.
Note that although Alice does not have a choice to make (formally, her strat-
egy set is a singleton), she does have beliefs about which strategy Bob will
choose. To represent Bob’s preference for a surprise proposal, we must incorpo-
rate Alice’s beliefs about Bob’s choice of strategy into Bob’s utility function. In
psychological game theory, this is accomplished by letting α ∈ [0, 1] be the prob-
ability that Alice assigns to Bob proposing, and defining Bob’s utility function
uB in some simple way so that it is decreasing in α if Bob chooses to propose,
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and increasing in α otherwise,1 as for instance in the following:
uB(x, α) =
 1− α if x = pα if x = ¬p.
The function uB agrees with Table 1.1 at its extreme points if we identify BAp
with α = 1 and ¬BAp with α = 0. Otherwise, for the continuum of other values
that α may take between 0 and 1, uB yields a linear combination of the corre-
sponding extreme points. Thus, in a sense, uB is a continuous approximation to
a scenario that is essentially discrete.
By contrast, we view Table 1.1 as defining Bob’s utility. To coax an actual
function from this table, let the variable S denote a situation, which for the time
being we can conceptualize as a collection of statements about the game; in this
case, S includes whether or not Bob is proposing, and whether or not Alice
believes he is proposing. We then define
uB(S) =

0 if p ∈ S and BA p ∈ S
1 if p ∈ S and ¬BA p ∈ S
1 if ¬p ∈ S and BA p ∈ S
0 if ¬p ∈ S and ¬BA p ∈ S.
In other words, Bob’s utility is a function not merely of the outcome of the game
(p or ¬p), but of a more general object we call a “situation”; his utility in a given
situation S depends on his own actions combined with Alice’s beliefs in ex-
actly the manner prescribed by Table 1.1. As noted above, we may very well
wish to refine our representation of Alice’s state of surprise using more than
two categories of likelihood; we could even allow a representation that permits
1Technically, Geanakoplos et al. [9] allow Bob’s utility to be a function of only his own beliefs;
this is generalized by Battigalli and Duwfenberg [4] in the context of extensive-form games, but
their approach is applicable to normal-form games as well.
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continuous probabilities, as has been done in the literature. We spell out these
straightforward generalizations in Example 3.0.5.
The central concept we develop in this paper is that of a language-based game,
where utility is defined not on outcomes but on situations. As noted, a situation
can be conceptualized as a collection of statements about the game; intuitively,
each statement is a description of something that might be relevant to a player’s
preferences, such as whether or not Alice believes that Bob will play a certain
strategy. Of course, this notion crucially depends on just what counts as an
admissible description. The set of all admissible descriptions—what we refer
to as the underlying language of the game—is a key component of our model.
Since utility is defined on situations, and situations are sets of descriptions taken
from the underlying language, a player’s preferences can depend, in principle,
on anything expressible in this language, but nothing more. Succintly: players
can prefer one state of the world to another if and only if they can describe the
difference between the two in the underlying language.
From a technical standpoint, this paper makes three major contributions.
First, we define a generalization of classical game theory and demonstrate its
versatility in modeling a wide variety of strategic scenarios, focusing in par-
ticular on psychological and reference-dependent effects. Second, we provide a
formal representation of coarse beliefs in a game-theoretic context. This exposes
an important insight: a discrete representation of belief, often conceptually and
technically easier to work with than its continuous counterpart, is sufficient to
capture psychological phenomena that have heretofore been modeled only in
a continuous framework. Moreover, as we show by example, utilities defined
over coarse beliefs provide a natural way of capturing some otherwise puz-
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zling behavior. Third, we provide novel equilibrium analyses for a broad class
of language-based games that do not depend on continuity assumptions as do
those of, for example, Geanakoplos et al. [9]. In particular, our main theorem
demonstrates that if the underlying language satisfies certain natural “compact-
ness” assumptions, then every game over this language admits rationalizable
strategies. By contrast, even under such compactness assumptions, not every
game admits a Nash equilibrium (see Example 3.0.4).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we develop the
basic apparatus needed to describe our approach. Chapter 3 presents a collec-
tion of examples intended to guide intuition and showcase the system. In Chap-
ter 4, we show that there is a natural route by which solution concepts such as
Nash equilibrium and rationalizability can be defined in our setting, and we
address the question of existence. Chapter 5 is an in-depth analysis of an exam-
ple studied by Ko¨szegi and Rabin [15], interpreted as a langugage-based game.
Chapter 6 discusses the relationship between Bayesian games and the frame-
work presented here. Appendix A collects the proofs that are omitted from the
main body.
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CHAPTER 2
FOUNDATIONS
2.1 Game forms and intuition
Much of the familiar apparatus of classical game theory is left untouched. A
game form is a tuple Γ = (N, (Σi)i∈N) where N is a finite set of players, which
for convenience we take to be the set {1, . . . , n}, and Σi is the set of strategies
available to player i. Following standard notation, we set
Σ :=
∏
i∈N
Σi and Σ−i :=
∏
j 6=i
Σj.
Elements of Σ are called outcomes or strategy profiles; given σ ∈ Σ, we denote by
σi the ith component of the tuple σ, and by σ−i the element of Σ−i consisting of
all but the ith component of σ.
Note that a game form does not come equipped with utility functions speci-
fying the preferences of players over outcomes Σ. The utility functions that we
employ are defined on situations, which in turn are determined by the underly-
ing language, so, before defining utility, we must first formalize these notions.
Informally, a situation is an exhaustive characterization of a given state of
affairs using descriptions drawn from the underlying language. Assuming for
the moment that we have access to a fixed “language”, we might imagine a
situation as being generated by simply listing all statements from that language
that happen to be true of the world. Even at this intuitive level, it should be
evident that the informational content of a situation is completely dependent
on the expressiveness of the language. If, for example, the underlying language
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consists of exactly two descriptions, “It’s raining” and “It’s not raining”, then
there are only two situations:
{“It’s raining”} and {“It’s not raining”}.
More formally, a situation S is a set of formulas drawn from a larger pool
of well-formed formulas, the underlying language. We require that S include
as many formulas as possible without being contradictory; this is made precise
below.
The present formulation, informal though it is, is sufficient to allow us to
capture a claim made in the introduction: any classical game can be recovered
in our framework with the appropriate choice of underlying language. Specifi-
cally, let the underlying language be Σ, the set of all strategy profiles. Situations,
in this case, are simply singleton subsets of Σ, as any larger set would contain
distinct and thus intuitively contradictory descriptions of the outcome of the
game. The set of situations can thus be identified with the set of outcomes, so
a utility function defined on outcomes is readily identified with one defined on
situations.
In this instance the underlying language, consisting solely of atomic, mutu-
ally incompatible formulas, is essentially structureless; one might wonder why
call it a “language” at all, rather than merely a “set”. Although, in principle,
there are no restrictions on the kinds of objects we might consider as languages,
it can be very useful to focus on those with some internal structure. This struc-
ture has two aspects: syntactic and semantic.
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2.2 Syntax, semantics, and situations
A formal language is typically generated from a set of atomic formulas using
some rules. For example, given a set Φ of primitive propositions, let L(Φ) denote
the language generated by starting with the formulas in Φ, and then closing off
under conjunction (∧) and negation (¬). (We can define ∨ and→ from ¬ and ∧
as usual.) L(Φ) is a language for reasoning about Boolean combinations of the
propositions in Φ. This is easily specialized to a game-theoretic setting. Given a
game form Γ = (N, (Σi)i∈N), let
ΦΓ = {play i(σi) : i ∈ N, σi ∈ Σi},
where we read play i(σi) as “player i is playing strategy σi”. Then L(ΦΓ) is a
language appropriate for reasoning about the strategies chosen by the players in
Γ. We sometimes write play(σ) as an abbreviation for play1(σ1)∧ · · · ∧ playn(σn).
Semantics provides a notion of truth. Recall that the semantics of classical
propositional logic is given by valuations v : Φ → {true, false}. Valuations are
extended to all formulas via the familiar truth tables for the logical connectives.
Each valuation v thereby generates a model, determining the truth values of ev-
ery formula in L(Φ). In the case of the language L(ΦΓ), we restrict this class of
models to those corresponding to an outcome σ ∈ Σ; that is, we consider only
valuations vσ defined by
vσ(play i(σ
′
i)) = true iff σ
′
i = σi,
so that, intuitively, each player chooses exactly one strategy. Denote this re-
stricted class of models byM(Γ).
Given a language L and a classM of models for L, a set F of formulas in L
is said to be satisfiable inM there is some model inM in which every formula
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of F is true. An (L,M)-situation is then defined to be a maximal set of formulas
in L that is satisfiable inM; that is, a satisfiable set with no proper superset that
is also satisfiable. In the game-theoretic setting, as we have seen, each model in
M(Γ) makes exactly one of the formulas play i(σi) true for each player i, so an
(L(ΦΓ),M(Γ))-situation can be identified with a strategy profile. We denote by
S(L,M) the set of (L,M)-situations. A game form Γ is extended to an (L,M)-
game by adding utility functions ui : S(L,M) → R, one for each player i ∈ N .
L is called the underlying language (of the game). We omit L and/orMwhen
talking about situations or games whenever it is safe to do so.
In an (L(ΦΓ),M(Γ))-game, as observed above, the players’ utility functions
are essentially defined on Σ, so an (L(ΦΓ),M(Γ))-game is really just a standard
normal-form game based on Γ. As we saw in Chapter 2.1, this class of games can
also be represented with the completely structureless language Σ. This may well
be sufficient for certain purposes, especially in cases where all we care about
are two or three formulas. However, the structure of an underlying language
L can be a powerful tool for studying the corresponding class of L-games; in
particular, a highly structured underlying language makes it easier to analyze
the much broader class of psychological games.
A psychological game is an extension of a standard normal-form game
except that players’ preferences can depend not only on what strategies are
played, but also on what beliefs are held. While L(ΦΓ) is appropriate for rea-
soning about strategies, it cannot express anything about beliefs. For this, we
use a standard modal logic of belief [8].
Fix a game form Γ = (N, (Σi)i∈N). Let LB(ΦΓ) be the language obtained
by starting with the formulas in Φ, then closing off under ∧, ¬, and the unary
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operators Bi for i = 1, . . . , n, so that if ϕ is a formula, so is Biϕ. We read Biϕ
as “player i believes ϕ”. We also make use of the abbreviation B̂i for ¬Bi¬,
and read B̂iϕ as “player i considers ϕ to be possible”. Intuitively, LB(ΦΓ) is a
language for reasoning about the beliefs of the players and the strategies being
played.
We give semantics to LB(ΦΓ) using a standard modal logic construction [10];
for many applications of interest, understanding the (completely standard, al-
though somewhat technical) details is not necessary. Example 1.0.1 was ulti-
mately analyzed as an LB(ΦΓ)-game, despite the fact that we had not even de-
fined the syntax of this language at the time, let alone its semantics. Chapter 3
provides more illustrations of this point.
A Γ-structure is a tuple M = (Ω, (si)i∈N , (PRi)i∈N) satisfying the following
conditions:
(P1) Ω is a nonempty measurable space;
(P2) PRi : Ω→ ∆(Ω) is measurable;
(P3) {ω′ : PRi(ω′) = PRi(ω)} is measurable and PRi(ω)({ω′ : PRi(ω′) =
PRi(ω)}) = 1;
(P4) si : Ω → Σi is such that {ω′ : si(ω′) = si(ω)} is measurable and
PRi(ω)({ω′ : si(ω′) = si(ω)}) = 1.
The set Ω is called the state space; ∆(Ω) denotes the measurable space of all
probability measures on Ω equipped with the σ-algebra generated by all sets of
the form {µ : µ(E) = 1}, for E ⊆ Ω measurable. Conditions (P1) and (P2)
set the stage to represent player i’s beliefs at state ω ∈ Ω using the probability
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measure PRi(ω) over the state space itself. Condition (P3) says essentially that
players are sure of their own beliefs. The functions si are called the strategy
functions, assigning to each state a strategy that we think of as what player i
is playing at that state. Condition (P4) thus asserts that each player is sure of
his own strategy. These assumptions are standard when representing belief in a
game-theoretic setting [2].
The language LB(ΦΓ) can be interpreted in any Γ-structure M via the strat-
egy functions, which induce a valuation [[·]]M : LB(ΦΓ)→ 2Ω defined recursively
by:
[[play i(σi)]]M := {ω ∈ Ω : si(ω) = σi}
[[¬ϕ]]M := Ω [[ϕ]]M
[[ϕ ∧ ψ]]M := [[ϕ]]M ∩ [[ψ]]M
[[Biϕ]]M := {ω ∈ Ω : PRi(ω)([[ϕ]]M) = 1}.
Thus, the Boolean connectives are interpreted classically, and Biϕ holds at state
ω just in case ϕ corresponds to a probability 1 event according to the measure
PRi(ω). It is easy to show (by induction on the structure of ϕ) that each set [[ϕ]]M
is measurable, so in particular the definition of [[Biϕ]]M makes sense.
LetMB(Γ) consist of all pairs of the form (M,ω), where M = (Ω, ~s, ~PR) is
a Γ-structure and ω ∈ Ω. Given ϕ ∈ LB(ΦΓ), we sometimes write (M,ω) |= ϕ
instead of ω ∈ [[ϕ]]M , and say that ω satisfies ϕ or ϕ is true at ω; we write M |= ϕ
and say that ϕ is valid in M if [[ϕ]]M = Ω. Given F ⊆ LB(ΦΓ), we write (M,ω) |=
F if for all ϕ ∈ F , (M,ω) |= ϕ.
It is not hard to see that when there is more than one player,
S(LB(ΦΓ),MB(Γ)) is infinite. A utility function ui : S(LB(ΦΓ),MB(Γ))→ R can
therefore be quite complicated. We will frequently be interested in representing
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preferences that are much simpler. For instance, though the surprise proposal
scenario presented in Example 1.0.1 can be viewed as an (LB(ΦΓ),MB(Γ))-
game, Bob’s utility uB does not depend on any situation as a whole, but rather
is determined a small set of formulas. This motivates the following general defi-
nition, identifying a particularly easy to understand and well-behaved subclass
of games.
Fix a language L and a class of modelsM for L. A function u : S(L,M) →
R is called finitely specified if there is a finite1 set of formulas F ⊂ L and a
function f : F → R such that every situation S ∈ S(L,M) contains exactly one
formula from F , and whenever ϕ ∈ S ∩ F , u(S) = f(ϕ). In other words, the
value of u depends only on the formulas in F . Thus, u is finitely specified if and
only if it can be written in the form
u(S) =

a1 if ϕ1 ∈ S
...
...
ak if ϕk ∈ S,
for some a1, . . . , ak ∈ R and ϕ1, . . . , ϕk ∈ L.
A language-based game is called finitely specified if each player’s utility
function is. Many games of interest are finitely specified. In a finitely speci-
fied game, we can think of a player’s utility as being a function of the finite set
F ; indeed, we can think of the underlying language as being the structureless
“language” F rather than L.
1If (L,M) is compact (see Chapter 4.3) then this finiteness condition on F is redundant. In
particular, this holds for (LB(ΦΓ),MB(Γ)).
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CHAPTER 3
EXAMPLES
We now provide a range of examples to exhibit both the simplicity and the
expressive power of the language-based approach. Since we focus on the lan-
guage LB(ΦΓ) and the corresponding class of models MB(Γ), we write S to
abbreviate S(LB(ΦΓ),MB(Γ)).
For each S ∈ S and each i ∈ N , note that there is a unique σi ∈ Σi such
that play i(σi) ∈ S; we can think of σi as the strategy that player i is playing in
the situation S. As such, when describing the utility of a situation, it is often
useful to extract this strategy; therefore, we define ρi : S → Σi implicitly by the
requirement play i(ρi(S)) ∈ S. It is easy to check that ρi is well-defined.
Example 3.0.1: Preparing for a roadtrip. Alice has two tasks to accomplish before
embarking on a cross-country roadtrip: she needs to buy a suitcase, and she
needs to buy a car.
Here we sketch a simple decision-theoretic scenario in a language-based
framework to illustrate the power of coarseness. In particular, we choose the
underlying language in such a way as to capture two well-known “irrational-
ities” of consumers. First, consumers often evaluate prices in a discontinuous
way, behaving, for instance, as if the difference between $299 and $300 is more
substantive than the difference between $300 and $301. Second, consumers who
are willing to put themselves out (for example, drive an extra 5 kilometers) to
save $50 on a $300 purchase are often not willing to make the same sacrifice for
the same savings on a $20,000 purchase (see [27]).
Both of the irrationalities described above can be captured by assuming a
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certain kind of coarseness, specifically, that the language over which Alice forms
preferences does not describe prices with infinite precision. Consider a lan-
guage with primitive propositions of the form pc, roughly interpreted as “the
price is about c”, equipped with semantics mapping these propositions to cer-
tain intervals of the real line. For instance, the language might consist of the
propositions p280, p290, and p300, interpreted respectively as the price ranges
[$280, $290), [$290, $300), and [$300, $310). Any utility function defined over
such a language cannot distinguish prices that fall into the same interval. Thus,
in the example above, Alice would consider the prices $300 and $301 to be ef-
fectively the same as far as her preferences are concerned. At the borderline
between intervals, however, there is the potential for a “jump”: we might rea-
sonably model Alice as prefering a situation described by p290 rather than by
p300—in other words, prefering to spend “about $290” rather than “about $300”.
In this context, a smart retailer would set the price of her product to be at
the upper end of an interval; of course, this assumes that the retailer has an un-
derstanding of the language over which their consumer base forms preferences
(and moreover that each consumer makes use of roughly the same language).
While there is some intuitive reason to think that certain cultural facts (like the
use of a base 10 number system) have an influence in this regard, clearly these
are major assumptions. Extending the language-based framework so as to cap-
ture players who can reason about the language of their opponents is therefore
a promising direction for future research.
The second irrationality discussed above can be captured by assuming that
the underlying language is not only coarse, but is coarser at higher prices. For
example, around the $20,000 mark, we might suppose that the language con-
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tains only the propositions p19000, p19500, and p20000, interpreted respectively as
the price ranges [$19000, $19500), [$19500, $20000), and [$20000, $20500). In this
case, while Alice may prefer a price of $300 to a price of $350, she cannot prefer a
price of $20,000 to a price of $20,050, because that difference cannot be described
in the underlying language.
This kind of analysis has a certain intuitive appeal: the larger the number (or,
more generally, the further removed something is, in space or time or abstrac-
tion), the more you “ballpark” it—the less precise your language is in describ-
ing it. Indeed, psychological experiments have demonstrated that Weber’s law1,
traditionally applied to physical stimuli, also finds purchase in the realm of nu-
merical perception: larger numbers are subjectively harder to discriminate from
one another [20, 23]. This type of example, as well as the observation that it can
be understood as an instance of Weber’s law, is due to Thaler [27]. Our choice
of underlying language represents the phenomenon simply, while exhibiting its
explanatory power.
But is it appropriate to model Alice using the coarse language described
above? Surely she has mastered the basics of the Arabic numeral system, and
can perfectly well describe the difference between 300 and 301, or between
20,000 and 20,050. How can this be reconciled with the use of coarseness? In-
tuitively, we think of Alice as using two languages: there is the (typically quite
rich) language used to describe the world in general, and the (typically much
coarser) language over which utility is defined—the underlying language. In
general, these two languages may be quite different. There may be, for exam-
ple, English words or mathematical expressions that have no correlate in Al-
1Weber’s law asserts that the minimum difference between two stimuli necessary for a sub-
ject to discriminate between them is proportional to the magnitude of the stimuli; thus, larger
stimuli require larger differences between them to be perceived.
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ice’s underlying language—there is a mathematical expression for each of the
infinitely-many natural numbers, but this should not entail that every such dis-
tinction is faithfully rendered in the representation of the world that Alice uses
when she makes decisions.2
The underlying language provides the model of the world that Alice uses
when she has to make a decision and evaluate her preferences; it describes the
features that are salient to her in a decision-making context. Of course, which
features are salient may be context-dependent, and how one identifies the ap-
propriate language (and semantics) for modeling a given scenario is an interest-
ing and important question. In the analysis above, for example, where did the
intervals come from? This is far from an idle concern, as the choice of bound-
aries can have nontrivial implications. In Alice’s case, although she cannot pre-
fer a price of $20,000 to a price of $20,050, she can prefer a price of $19,950 to a
price of $20,000. Some might deny that this is a reasonable assumption, arguing
perhaps that the interval corresponding to p20000 should be centered on $20,000
instead, or denying the existence of sharp boundaries altogether. But even if
sharp boundaries are accommodated, the question of their origin is critical, if
for no other reason than their obvious potential for exploitation.
One natural way of modeling the context-dependence of the underlying lan-
guage is to assume that, while the syntax is fixed, the meanings of words can
depend on context. For example, we might think of a typical consumer as rea-
soning about prices with a fixed collection of categories (e.g. “free”, “cheap”,
“good deal”, “fair price”, “a bit much”, “expensive”, and “prohibitive”), but
2Conversely, there may be descriptions in the underlying language that don’t correspond to
anything in, say, English. In a blind taste test, Bob might say that he prefers one type of ice
cream to others, without being able to express verbally what it is about the taste experience that
leads to the preference.
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the mapping from these terms in the underlying language to real cost varies de-
pending on the shopping context. When buying a car, “cheap” might include
prices of several hundred or even several thousand dollars, but when dining
out similar prices for the entre´es could well be considered “prohibitive”. An-
other familiar case that seems to typify this pattern is found in the end-of-year
assignment of letter grades to students in a class. Once again the syntax is fixed
(A+, A, A–, B+, etc.), but what exactly counts as an A+ is not. In many cases
this is determined on the fly, with instructors essentially eyeballing boundaries
between categories in such a way as to coincide with gaps in the raw scores,
precisely so as to avoid sharp discontinuities in grades. Cases like these are
especially interesting because they give some insight into the mechanics that
govern the determination of the mapping from language to the world. Such a
context-dependent semantics might also help explain the well-known anchoring
effect [28]: the first price an agent is exposed to might tend to be classified as
“reasonable” or “fair”, with all other categories being determined relative to
that initial calibration. Integrating this conception of a variable semantics into
the language-based framework is clearly an important direction for future re-
search.
Example 3.0.2: The Allais paradox [1]. Consider the two pairs of gambles de-
scribed in Table 3.1. The first pair is a choice between (1a) $1 million for sure,
versus (1b) a .89 chance of $1 million, a .1 chance of $5 million, and a .01 chance
of nothing. The second is a choice between (2a) a .89 chance of nothing and a
.11 chance of $1 million, versus (2b) a .9 chance of nothing and a .1 chance of $5
million. The “paradox” arises from the fact that most people choose (1a) over
(1b), and most people choose (2b) over (2a) [1], but these preferences are not
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Gamble 1a Gamble 1b
1 $1 million .89 $1 million
.1 $5 million
.01 $0
Gamble 2a Gamble 2b
.89 $0 .9 $0
.11 $1 million .1 $5 million
Table 3.1: The Allais paradox
simultaneously compatible with expected utility maximization.
Coarseness in the language of preference offers a simple and intuitive expla-
nation of this phenomenon, and by essentially the same mechanism at play in
Example 3.0.1. Let us assume that probability judgements such as “there is a .11
chance of getting $1 million” are represented in a language with only finitely-
many “levels” of likelihood. In particular, suppose the language has only the de-
scriptions “no chance”, “slight chance”, “unlikely”, and their respective oppo-
sites, “certain”, “near certain”, and “likely”, interpreted as in Table 3.2. Suppose
True likelihood Description Approximation
1 certain 1
[.95, 1) near certain .975
[.85, .95) likely .9
(.05, .15] unlikely .1
(0, .05] slight chance .025
0 no chance 0
Table 3.2: Coarse likelihood approximations
further that for the purposes of utility, “expected” values are calculated using
approximations obtained by identifying each “level” of likelihood with its mid-
point; thus, a “slight chance” is approximated as a .025 chance, a “likely” event
as a .9 probability, and so on.
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Revisting the gambles associated with the Allais paradox, we see that the
rounding errors introduced by coarseness change Alice’s evaluation of the gam-
bles significantly (Table 3.3). For one thing, probabilities of .89 and .9 are not
Gamble 1a Gamble 1b
certain $1 million likely $1 million
unlikely $5 million
slight chance $0
Gamble 2a Gamble 2b
likely $0 likely $0
unlikely $1 million unlikely $5 million
Table 3.3: The Allais pardox, coarsely described
distinguished at all (nor are .1 and .11), which immediately implies that (2b) is
preferred to (2a), provided uA($5 million) > uA($1 million). On the other hand,
likelihoods of 0 and .01 are not only distinguished by this language, but their
difference is effectively exaggerated. Table 3.4 shows the result of substituting
the approximations from Table 3.2 in for the descriptions of Table 3.3. We can
Gamble 1a Gamble 1b
1 $1 million .9 $1 million
.1 $5 million
.025 $0
Gamble 2a Gamble 2b
.9 $0 .9 $0
.1 $1 million .1 $5 million
Table 3.4: The Allais paradox, coarsely approximated
calculate the revised utility of (1b) to be
.9 · uA($1 million) + .1 · uA($5 million) + .025 · uA($0),
and this quantity may well be less than uA($1 million), depending on the utility
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function uA. For example, if
uA($1 million) = 1
uA($5 million) = 3
uA($0) = −10,
then the utility of gamble (1b) evaluates to .95. In this case, Alice prefers (2b) to
(2a) but also prefers (1a) to (1b).
Rubinstein [24] has offered a closely related analysis of the kind of reason-
ing that guides decision making in Allais-type environments. He suggests that
agents may simplify some choice problems by “canceling” certain parameters
that are judged to be sufficiently similar; for instance, the similarity between 0.1
and 0.11 might lead one to view gamble 2 as essentially a choice between $1 mil-
lion and $5 million. Clearly this is very much in the same spirit as our analysis;
indeed, Rubinstein goes on to observe that the same lottery may be subject to
different similarity judgements depending on how it is presented. Thus, while
he does not explicitly or formally invoke language as the object of preference
(instead he develops a theory based on similarity relations), certainly much of
the insight inherent in the use of language for the purpose of capturing coarse-
ness effects is anticipated in his work.
It is worth taking a closer look at the particular type of coarseness we have
employed here. With the exception of giving 0 its own category, the other
boundaries appear rather arbitrary. Why should the probabilities 0.1 and 0.11
fall into the same category? A different partition could have separated them;
indeed, it seems plausible that if Alice had instead been presented with gam-
bles involving the probabilities 0.1, 0.101, 0.109, 0.11, and 0.111, then she may
well have categorized 0.1 separately from 0.11. This is reminiscent of the case
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of the instructor assigning letter-grades considered in Example 3.0.1, and once
again brings to attention the importance of understanding how categories are
chosen—or, in our terms, how expressions in a given syntax are given seman-
tics.
The fact that coarseness plays the pivotal role both in our analysis of the
Allais paradox and also in understanding the behaviours discussed in Example
3.0.1 is notable because the domain of coarseness is quite different in these two
cases. In Example 3.0.1, it is prices that are subject to conflation, whereas in this
example it is degrees of belief. A unified analysis of these two cases is possible
in our framework precisely because the underlying language can be rich enough
to talk about not only traditional objects of preference, like prices, but also other
relevant characteristics, like beliefs.
Example 3.0.3: Playing the lottery. Alice buys a lottery ticket, despite the fact
that the purchase is, technically, an expected loss. Moreover, she buys only 1
ticket, not two, and not as many as she can afford.
One possible explanation for why people buy lottery tickets is that they are
just wrong about the odds—they think the chance of winning such a large sum
of money overcomes the cost of the ticket, rendering the transaction an expected
gain. While it is reasonable that with such large and small numbers involved
mistakes might be made, this is on the whole not a convincing account of the
rationale behind playing the lottery. The flaw is very basic: if buying one ticket
were evaluated as an expected gain, then buying two or ten thousand tickets
should be viewed as even better.
In Example 3.0.2, we saw that coarseness in the underlying language can
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result in some differences of likelihood being collapsed, and others exaggerated.
These types of rounding errors can also be employed to explain the allure of
playing the lottery.
Consider a simple lottery in which each ticket costs $1 and provides a
0.00005% chance to win $1 million, so each ticket in fact yields an expected loss
of 50¢. But suppose also that the lowest non-zero level of likelihood express-
ible in Alice’s language of preference, the “slight chance” description, subsumes
anything up to a 0.01% probability, and is evaluated for the purposes of utility
calculations as a 0.005% probability. In this case, the expected value of purchas-
ing a lottery ticket, which costs $1 and provides a “slight chance” of winning $1
million, jumps up to a gain of $49. Perhaps more striking, the expected value
of purchasing two lottery tickets, which costs $2 but still provides, as far as the
language is concerned, a “slight chance” of winning $1 million, is only a gain
of $48! Thus, Alice prefers to buy one ticket rather than none—and rather than
two.
Note that this analysis assumes that Alice conceptualizes purchases of more
than one lottery ticket as a single transaction; that is, she considers buying two
tickets to be an act of paying $2 for a 0.0001% chance to win, which, as noted,
is still just a “slight chance” as far as her language of preference is concerned.
One argument for making this assumption is that it allows us to explain with
a simple mechanism widely attested behaviour. But in identifying it as an as-
sumption, we can also ask when it does not hold.
The answer to this question has economic implications. If Alice buys a lot-
tery ticket every weekend, we might reasonably assume that she does not lump
these purchases together into one cumulative chance of winning. Rather, she
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considers her purchase of a lottery ticket one week to be distinct from her pur-
chase the previous week. If this conceptual separation of the two purchases
were induced by other means, without the time delay, it could be exploited to
get people to buy more than one lottery ticket at once. Indeed, this tactic is
arguably already in widespread use; for example, the Canadian lottery “Lotto
6/49” offers an option called “Encore” which, for a small additional fee, allow
the purchaser to essentially play a second, smaller lottery.
Example 3.0.4: Indignant altruism. Alice and Bob sit down to play a classic game
of prisoner’s dilemma, with one twist: neither wishes to live up to low expec-
tations. Specifically, if Bob expects the worst of Alice (i.e. expects her to defect),
then Alice, indignant at Bob’s opinion of her, prefers to cooperate. Likewise
for Bob. On the other hand, in the absense of such low expectations from their
opponent, each will revert to their classical preferences.
The standard prisoner’s dilemma is summarized in Table 3.5:
c d
c (3,3) (0,5)
d (5,0) (1,1)
Table 3.5: The classical prisoner’s dilemma.
Let uA, uB denote the two players’ utility functions according to this table,
and let Γ denote the game form obtained by throwing away these functions: Γ =
({A,B},ΣA,ΣB), where ΣA = ΣB = {c,d}. We wish to define an LB(ΦΓ)-game
that captures the given scenario; to do so we must define new utility functions
on S. Informally, if Bob is sure that Alice will defect, then Alice’s utility for
defecting is −1, regardless of what Bob does, and likewise reversing the roles of
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Alice and Bob; otherwise, utility is determined exactly as it is classically.
Formally, we simply define u′A : S → R by
u′A(S) =

−1 if playA(d) ∈ S and
BB playA(d) ∈ S
uA(ρA(S), ρB(S)) otherwise,
and similarly for u′B.
Intuitively, cooperating is rational for Alice if she thinks that Bob is sure she
will defect, since cooperating in this case would yield a minimum utility of 0,
whereas defecting would result in a utility of −1. On the other hand, if Alice
thinks that Bob is not sure that she will defect, then since her utility in this case
is determined classically, it is rational for her to defect, as usual.
This game has much in common with the surprise proposal of Example 1.0.1:
in both games, the essential element is the desire to surprise another player.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, when players wish to surprise their opponents, Nash
equilibria fail to exist—even mixed strategy equilibria. Although we have not
yet defined Nash equilibrium in our setting, the classical intuition is wholly
applicable: a Nash equilibrium is a state of play where players are happy with
their choice of strategies given accurate beliefs about what their opponents will choose.
But there is a fundamental tension between a state of play where everyone has
accurate beliefs, and one where some player successfully surprises another.
We show formally in Chapter 4.2 that this game has no Nash equilibrium
(Proposition 4.2.1). On the other hand, players can certainly best-respond to
their beliefs. In Chapter 4.3 we provide a natural definition of rationalizability
in our framework, and show that every strategy for the indignant altruist is
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rationalizable (Proposition 4.3.1).
Example 3.0.5: The trust game. Alice is handed $2 and given a choice: either
split the money with Bob, or hand him all of it. If she splits the money, the game
is over and they each walk away with $1. If she hands the money to Bob, it is
doubled to $4, and Bob is offered a choice: either share the money equally with
Alice, or keep it all for himself. However, if Bob chooses to keep the money for
himself, then he suffers from guilt to the extent that he let Alice down.
This is a paraphrasing of the “psychological trust game” [4]; we consider it
here as a normal-form game. The monetary payoffs are summarized in Figure
3.1:
Figure 3.1: Monetary payoffs in the trust game.
Let mA and mB denote the monetary utility functions corresponding to Fig-
ure 3.1, and let Γ = ({A,B}, {split,hand}, {keep, share}). To capture Bob’s guilt
aversion using LB(ΦΓ)-situations, let
uB(S) =

−1 if play(hand, keep) ∈ S
and BA playB(share) ∈ S
mB(ρA(S), ρB(S)) otherwise;
Alice’s preferences are simply given by
uA(S) = mA(ρA(S), ρB(S)).
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In other words, Bob feels guilty in those situations where Alice hands him the
money and is sure he will share it, but he doesn’t.3 On the other hand, even if
Alice chooses to hand the money over, uB tells us that Bob does not feel guilty
betraying her provided she had some bit of doubt about his action. We show in
Chapter 4.2 that the only Nash equilibrium in which Alice places any weight at
all on her strategy hand is the pure equilibrium where she plays hand and Bob
plays share (Proposition 4.2.2).
A more satisfying account of this game might involve a finer-grained repre-
sentation of Alice’s expectations. To model this, we must enrich the underlying
language. Given a subset Θ ⊆ [0, 1], let LΘB(ΦΓ) be the language obtained by
starting with the formulas play i(σi) ∈ ΦΓ and closing off under ∧, ¬, and Bθi ,
where θ ∈ Θ. We think of the elements of Θ as indicating “thresholds” or “lev-
els” of belief; the higher the number, the stronger the belief. Semantics for this
language are given by augmenting the valuation function as follows:
[[Bθi ϕ]] := {ω ∈ Ω : PRi(ω)([[ϕ]]) ≥ θ}.
3A subtle issue arises here regarding the sense in which utility is actually “felt”. Of course,
in a situation where Alice expects Bob to share and he doesn’t, he might not, in fact, feel guilty,
because he might not realize that Alice expected him to share. In general, if Bob’s utility in a
given situation is conceptualized as how happy he actually feels in that situation, then defining
it in terms of something he doesn’t have epistemic access to (like Alice’s beliefs) is problematic.
In fact, this issue arises even in the classical setting: a player may never actually observe the
strategy his opponent plays.
One natural reformulation runs as follows: the utility of an outcome for Bob is how happy
Bob would feel if he knew that was indeed the outcome. While this story seems to do the job in
the classical case, it encounters difficulty in the more general context of language-based games
because there are situations that Bob can never know he is in. For example, any situation S such
that p ∧ ¬BBp ∈ S is, by construction, not a situation Bob can know he is in. Nonetheless, it
makes perfect sense for Bob to prefer such a situation S to some other one S′ with, say, ¬p ∧
BB¬p ∈ S (perhaps he prefers to live in world where unicorns in fact exist though he doesn’t
believe it, rather than discover definitive evidence that they are make-believe).
As is standard, we view utility as a numeric representation of preference, and thinking in
terms of preference rather than happiness helps to clarify this issue. It seems to us perfectly
reasonable that an agent can contemplate different conceivable situations, which are just de-
scriptions of the world in the language he considers relevant, and assign to them utility values
that reflect his preferences among them.
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Thus, the formulaBθi ϕ is interpreted as saying “player i considers the likelihood
of ϕ to be at least θ”. The language LB(ΦΓ) can be viewed as the special case
where Θ = {1}.
Consider, for example, the language corresponding to the set of thresholds
Θ = {1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 4/5, 1}. A graded version of Bob’s guilt aversion can then be
captured in an LΘB(ΦΓ)-game by defining u′B : S(LΘB(ΦΓ))→ R by
u′B(S) =

4− k′ if play(hand, keep) ∈ S
and B1/5A playB(share) ∈ S
mB(ρA(S), ρB(S)) otherwise,
where
k′ := max{k : Bk/5A playB(share) ∈ S}.
As before, Bob feels guilty if he keeps the money that Alice handed to him pro-
vided she expected him to share it, but in this case “expected” means “thought
there was at least a 20% chance of”, and moreover, how guilty Bob feels in-
creases in several discrete increments as Alice’s expectations grow stronger.
When Θ = [0, 1], we can define a utility function to capture what might be
thought of as “continuous” guilt; that is, guilt that depends in a continuous way
on Alice’s beliefs: define u′′B : S(L[0,1]B (ΦΓ))→ R by
u′′B(S) =
 4− 5θ
′ if play(hand, keep) ∈ S
mB(ρA(S), ρB(S)) otherwise,
where
θ′ := sup{θ : BθA playB(share) ∈ S}.
In psychological game theory, utility functions depend on beliefs as represented
in this continuous manner. We have seen, however, that there are conceptual
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and theoretical advantages to modeling categorical beliefs, where Θ is finite.
While it is certainly possible to define a utility function in a psychological game
that mimics such categoricity (a step function, for example), such a function is
not continuous and therefore not subsumed by the equilibrium analyses that
are provided in that literature. Language-based games offer new tools for equi-
librium analyses that are able to handle such discontinuities naturally.
Example 3.0.6: Pay raise. Bob has been voted employee of the month at his
summer job, an honour that comes with a slight increase (up to $1) in his per-
hour salary, at the discretion of his boss, Alice. Bob’s happiness is determined
in part by the raw value of the bump he receives in his wages, and in part by the
sense of gain or loss he feels by comparing the increase Alice grants him with
the minimum increase he expected to get. Alice, for her part, wants Bob to be
happy, but this desire is balanced by a desire to save company money.
As usual, we first fix a game form that captures the players and their avail-
able strategies. Let Γ = ({A,B},ΣA, {·}), where ΣA = {s0, s1, . . . , s100} and sk
represents an increase of k cents to Bob’s per-hour salary (Bob has no choice to
make, so his strategy set is a singleton). Notice that in this game Bob’s prefer-
ences depend on his own beliefs rather than the beliefs of his opponent. Broadly
speaking, this is an example of reference-dependent preferences: Bob’s utility is
determined in part by comparing the actual outcome of the game to some “ref-
erence level”—in this case, the minimum expected raise. This game also has
much in common with a scenario described by Battigalli and Duwfenberg [4],
in which a player Abi wishes to tip her taxi driver exactly as much as he expects
to be tipped, but no more.
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Define uB : S → R by setting
uB(S) = kS + (kS − rS),
where kS is the unique integer such that playA(sk) ∈ S, and
rS := min{r′ : B̂B playA(sr′) ∈ S}.
Observe that rS is completely determined by Bob’s beliefs: it is the lowest raise
he considers it possible that Alice will grant him. We think of the first summand
kS as representing Bob’s happiness on account of receiving a raise of kS cents
per hour, while the second summand kS− rS represents his sense of gain or loss
depending on how reality compares to his lowest expectations.
Note that the value of rS (and kS) is encoded in S via a finite formula; in
other words, we could have written the definition of uB in a fully expanded
form where each utility value is specified by the presence of a formula in S. For
instance, the combination kS = 5, rS = 2 corresponds to the formula
playA(s5) ∧ B̂B playA(s2) ∧ ¬(B̂B playA(s0) ∨ B̂B playA(s1))
being in S; this combination leads to S having a utility of 8.
Of course, it is just as easy to replace the minimum with the maximum in the
above definition (perhaps Bob feels entitled to the most he considers it possible
he might get), or even to define the reference level as some more complicated
function of Bob’s beliefs. The quantity kS − rS representing Bob’s sense of gain
or loss is also easy to manipulate. For instance, given α, β ∈ R, we might define
a function f : R→ R by
f(x) =
 αx if x ≥ 0βx if x < 0,
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and set
u′B(S) = kS + f(kS − rS).
Choosing, say, α = 1 and β > 1 results in Bob’s utility u′B incorporating loss
aversion: Bob is more upset by a relative loss than he is elated by a same-sized
relative gain. These kinds of issues are discussed by Ko¨szegi and Rabin [15]; in
Chapter 5 we analyze a central example from this paper in detail.
Turning now to Alice’s preferences, we are faced with a host of modeling
choices. Perhaps Alice wishes to grant Bob the smallest salary increase he ex-
pects but nothing more. We can capture this by defining uA : S → R by setting
uA(S) = −|kS − rS|.
Or perhaps we wish to represent Alice as feeling some fixed sense of guilt if
she undershoots, while her disutility for overshooting depends on whether she
merely exceeded Bob’s lowest expectations, or in fact exceeded even his highest
expectations:
u′A(S) =

−25 if kS < rS
rS − kS if rS ≤ kS < R
rS −RS + 2(RS − kS) if kS ≥ RS ,
where
RS := max{R′ : B̂B playA(sR′) ∈ S}.
Or perhaps Alice’s model of Bob’s happiness is sophisticated enough to include
his sensations of gain and loss, so that, for example,
u′′A(S) = uB(S)− δkS,
where δ is some scaling factor. The framework is rich enough to represent many
possibilities.
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Example 3.0.7: A deeply surprising proposal. Bob hopes to propose to Alice, but
she wants it to be a surprise. He knows that she would be upset if it were not
a surprise, so he would prefer not to propose if Alice so much as suspects it.
Worse (for Bob), even if Alice does not suspect a proposal, if she suspects that
Bob thinks she does, then she will also be upset, since in this case a proposal
would indicate Bob’s willingness to disappoint her. Of course, like the giant
tortoise on whose back the world rests, this reasoning continues “all the way
down”...
This example is adapted from a similar example given by Geanakoplos et
al. [9]; in their story, the man is considering giving a gift of flowers, but rather
than hoping to surprise the recipient, his goal is the exact opposite: to get her
flowers just in case she is expecting them. Of course, the notion of “expectation”
employed, both in their example and ours, is quite a bit more complicated than
the usual sense of the word, involving arbitrarily deeply nested beliefs.
Nonetheless, it is relatively painless to represent Bob’s preferences in the
language LB(ΦΓ), where Γ = ({A,B}, {·}, {p, q}) and p and q stand for Bob’s
strategies of proposing and not proposing, respectively (Alice has no decision
to make, so her strategy set is a singleton). We use B̂Ap as our gloss for Alice “so
much as suspecting” a proposal. Define uB : S → R by
uB(S) =

1 if playB(p) ∈ S and
(∀k ∈ N)[B̂A(B̂BB̂A)kplayB(p) /∈ S]
1 if playB(q) ∈ S and
(∃k ∈ N)[B̂A(B̂BB̂A)kplayB(p) ∈ S]
0 otherwise,
where (B̂BB̂A)k is an abbreviation for B̂BB̂A · · · B̂BB̂A (k times). In other words,
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proposing yields a higher utility for Bob in the situation S if and only if none of
the formulas in the infinite family {B̂A(B̂BB̂A)kplayB(p) : k ∈ N} occur in S.
As in Examples 1.0.1 and 3.0.4, and in general when a player desires to sur-
prise an opponent, it is not difficult to convince oneself informally that this game
admits no Nash equilibrium. But in this case the infinitary nature of Bob’s de-
sire to “surprise” Alice has an even stronger effect: as we show in Chapter 4.3,
no strategy for Bob is even rationalizable (Proposition 4.3.3).
Example 3.0.8: Returning a library book. Alice has learned that a book she bor-
rowed from the library is due back tomorrow. As long as she returns it by tomor-
row, she’ll avoid a late fee; returning it today, however, is mildly inconvenient.
Here we make use of an extremely simple example to illustrate how to model
an ostensibly dynamic scenario in a static framework by employing a suitable
underlying language. The idea is straightforward: Alice has a choice to make to-
day, but how she feels about it depends on what she might do tomorrow. Specif-
ically, if she returns the library book tomorrow, then she has no reason to feel
bad about not returning it today. Since the future has yet to be determined, we
model Alice’s preferences as depending on what action she takes in the present
together with what she expects to do in the future.
Let Γ = (A, {return,wait}) be a game form representing Alice’s two current
options, and set Φ′Γ := ΦΓ ∪ {tomorrow}; thus Φ′Γ is the usual set of primitive
propositions (representing strategies) together with a single new addition, to-
morrow, read “Alice will return the book tomorrow”.
An LB(Φ′Γ)-game allows us to specify Alice’s utility in a manner consistent
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with the intuition given above. In particular, we can define uA : S(LB(Φ′Γ))→ R
by
uA(S) =

−1 if playA(return) ∈ S
1 if playA(wait) ∧BAtomorrow ∈ S
−5 otherwise,
so Alice prefers to wait if she expects to return the book tomorrow, and to return
the book today otherwise.
In this example, Alice’s utility depends on her beliefs, as it does in psycho-
logical game theory. Unlike psychological game theory, however, her utility
depends on her beliefs about features of the world aside from which strategies
are being played. This is a natural extension of the psychological framework in
a language-based setting.
We might want to expand the set of actions by providing Alice with ways to
influence her beliefs about tomorrow. For example, perhaps a third strategy is
available to her, remind, describing a state of affairs where she keeps the book
but places it on top of her keys, thus decreasing the likelihood that she will for-
get to take it when she leaves the next day. More generally, this simple frame-
work allows us to model commitment devices [7]: we can represent players who
rationally choose to perform certain actions (like buying a year-long gym mem-
bership, or throwing away their “fat jeans”) not because these actions benefit
them immediately, but because they make it subjectively more likely that the
player will perform certain other desirable actions in the future (like going to
the gym regularly, or sticking with a diet) that might otherwise be neglected. In
a similar manner, we can succinctly capture procrastination: if, for example, you
believe that you will quit smoking tomorrow, then the health benefits of quit-
ting today instead might seem negligible—so negligible, in fact, that quitting
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immediately may seem pointless, even foolish. Of course, believing you will do
something tomorrow is not the same thing as actually doing it when tomorrow
comes, thus certain tasks may be delayed repeatedly.
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CHAPTER 4
SOLUTION CONCEPTS
A number of important concepts from classical game theory, such as Nash
equilibrium and rationalizability, have been characterized epistemically, using
Γ-structures. In LB(ΦΓ)-games (or, more generally, in language-based games
where the language includes belief), we can use these epistemic characteriza-
tions to define the corresponding solution concepts. This yields natural defini-
tions that generalize those of classical game theory.
4.1 Rationality
A player i is called rational if he is best-responding to his beliefs: the strategy
σi he is using must yield an expected utility that is at least as high as any other
strategy σ′i he could play. In classical game theory, the meaning of this statement
is quite clear: player i has beliefs about the strategies his opponents are using in
the form of a probability distribution pi on Σ−i, and the expected utility of σ′i is
defined to be ∑
σ−i∈Σ−i
ui(σ
′
i, σ−i) · pi(σ−i).
This definition encodes an important assumption. In order to determine the
strategy that maximizes expected utility, players must consider what their ex-
pected utility would be if they were to play a different strategy. This, in turn,
requires them to have beliefs about what other players would do if they were
to play a different strategy. The standard assumption is that a player’s beliefs
about what other players are doing do not change, regardless of which strategy
he is considering. This assumption is easy to overlook, and has received rela-
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tively little attention in the literature (but see [11, 25]); however, it is far from
innocuous. It rules out, for example, the possibility that players can read each
others’ body language and thereby glean some information about their oppo-
nents’ intended strategies.
These issues become much more significant in the context of language-based
games. Even if we assume that a player’s beliefs about other players’ strategies
do not change when she contemplates switching to a different strategy, what
about her other beliefs? For instance, in Example 3.0.8, if S is a situation where
Alice plays return, what would happen to her beliefs regarding tomorrow if she
were to play wait? Should they stay the same? That is far from clear. It seems
reasonable to expect that Alice’s choice of action should affect her beliefs about
when she will return the library book. But answering this question is critical in
order to decide if playing wait has higher expected utility than playing return.
In general, it seems that determining what a player’s expected utility would
be if she were to switch strategies requires more information regarding counter-
factuals than is given by a Γ-structure. However, when we restrict our attention
to the language LB(ΦΓ), we can make precise the intuition that a player’s be-
liefs about other players’ beliefs and strategies remains constant when she con-
templates switching strategies. This gives us a general procedure for defining
rationality in LB(ΦΓ)-games.
A formula ϕ ∈ LB(ΦΓ) is i-independent if every occurrence of a subformula
of the form play i(σi) in ϕ falls within the scope of some Bj , j 6= i. Intuitively, an
i-independent formula describes a proposition that is independent of player i’s
choice of strategy, such as another player’s strategy, another player’s beliefs, or
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even player i’s beliefs about the other players. Given S ∈ S, set
ρ−i(S) = {ϕ ∈ S : ϕ is i-independent}.1
Let S−i denote the image of S under ρ−i. Elements of S−i are called i-situations;
intuitively, they are complete descriptions of states of affairs that are out of
player i’s control. Informally, an i-situation S−i ∈ S−i determines everything
about the world (expressible in the language) except what strategy player i is
employing. This is made precise in Proposition 4.1.1. Recall that ρi(S) denotes
the (unique) strategy that i plays in S, so play i(ρi(S)) ∈ S.
Proposition 4.1.1: For each i ∈ N , the map ~ρi : S → Σi × S−i defined by ~ρi(S) =
(ρi(S), ρ−i(S)) is a bijection.
This identification of S with the set of pairs Σi×S−i provides a well-defined
notion of what it means to alter player i’s strategy in a situation S “without
changing anything else”. By an abuse of notation, we write ui(σi, S−i) to denote
ui(S) where S is the unique situation satisfying ~ρi(S) = (σi, S−i). Observe that
for each state ω ∈ Ω and each i ∈ N , there is a unique set S−i ∈ S−i such that
ω |= S−i. We denote this set by S−i(M,ω), or just S−i(ω) when the Γ-structure is
clear from context. Then the utility functions ui induce functions uˆi : Σi×Ω→ R
defined by
uˆi(σi, ω) = ui(σi, S−i(ω)).
As in the classical case, we can view the quantity uˆi(σi, ω) as the utility that
player i would have if he were to play σi at state ω. It is easy to see that this
1As (quite correctly) pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, this notation is not standard,
since ρ−i is not a profile of functions of the type ρi. Nonetheless, we feel it is appropriate in the
sense that, while ρi extracts from a given situation player i’s strategy, ρ−i extracts “all the rest”
(cf. Proposition 4.1.1), the crucial difference here being that this includes far more than just the
strategies of the other players.
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generalizes the classical approach in the sense that it agrees with the classical
definition when the utility functions ui depend only on the outcome.
For each i ∈ N and σi ∈ Σi, provided that uˆi(σi, · ) is measurable, we can
define the expected utility of playing σi at ω by
EUi(σi, ω) :=
∫
Ω
uˆi(σi, ω
′) dPRi(ω);
when Ω is finite, this reduces to
EUi(σi, ω) :=
∑
ω′∈Ω
uˆi(σi, ω
′) · PRi(ω)(ω′).
We can then define BRi : Ω→ 2Σi by
BRi(ω) = {σi ∈ Σi : (∀σ′i ∈ Σi)[EUi(σi, ω) ≥ EUi(σ′i, ω)]};
thus BRi(ω) is the set of best-reponses of player i to his beliefs at ω, that is, the set
of strategies that maximize his expected utility.
With this apparatus in place, we expand the underlying language to incor-
porate rationality as a formal primitive. Note that we are not replacing LB(ΦΓ)
as the underlying language of the game over which the utility functions are de-
fined, but simply defining a richer language that will be useful for analyzing the
game. Let
ΦratΓ := ΦΓ ∪ {RAT i : i ∈ N},
where we read RAT i as “player i is rational”. We also employ the syntactic
abbreviationRAT ≡ RAT 1∧· · ·∧RAT n. Intuitively, LB(ΦratΓ ) allows us to reason
about whether or not players are being rational with respect to their beliefs and
preferences, in the sense of expected utility maximization. Formally, we extend
the valuation function [[·]]M to LB(ΦratΓ ) by setting
[[RAT i]]M := {ω ∈ Ω : si(ω) ∈ BRi(ω)}.
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Thus RAT i holds at state ω just in case the strategy that player i is playing at
that state, si(ω), is a best-response to his beliefs.2
4.2 Nash equilibrium
Having formalized rationality, we are in a position to draw on work that char-
acterizes solutions concepts in terms of RAT .
Let Γ = (N, (Σi)i∈N) be a game form in which each set Σi is finite, and let
∆(Σi) denote the set of all probability measures on Σi. Elements of ∆(Σi) are
the mixed strategies of player i. Given a mixed strategy profile
µ = (µ1, . . . , µn) ∈ ∆(Σ1)× · · · ×∆(Σn),
we define a Γ-structure Mµ that, in a sense made precise below, captures “equi-
librium play” of µ and can be used to determine whether or not µ constitutes a
Nash equilibrium.
Set
Ωµ = supp(µ1)× · · · × supp(µn) ⊆ Σ1 × · · · × Σn.
2There is a subtlety here. Normally, we define the valuation function [[ϕ]]M (or, equivalently,
|=) by induction on the structure of ϕ. But here it is important that we define [[RAT i]]M after we
have defined [[ϕ]]M for all formulas in LB(ΦΓ). The semantics of RAT i implicitly assumes this,
since it depends on the function uˆi, which in turn depends on the LB(ΦΓ)-formulas that are
satisfied at each state. Moreover, had we added the formulas RAT i to the underlying language
there would have been circularity in the semantics: to define rationality, we would need to
define best response, while to define best response, we would need to define the utility function
on situations that included formulas that talk about rationality. Nevertheless, it does not seem so
unreasonable to have preferences that depend on rationality. For example, a player might prefer
to have others believe that he is irrational, and therefore might play an arguably incredible
threat. We defer a discussion of these issues to future work.
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For each σ, σ′ ∈ Ωµ, let
PRµ,i(σ)(σ′) =

∏
j 6=i µj(σj) if σi = σ
′
i
0 otherwise.
Let Mµ = (Ωµ, idΩµ , ~PRµ). It is easy to check that Mµ is a Γ-structure; call it
the characteristic Γ-structure for µ. At each state in Mµ, each player i is sure
of his own strategy and has uncertainty about the strategies of his opponents;
however, this uncertainty takes the form of a probability distribution weighted
according to µ−i, so in effect each player i correctly ascribes the mixed strategy
µj to each of his opponents j 6= i. It is well known (and easy to show) that
a mixed strategy profile µ is a Nash equilibrium in the classical sense if and
only if each player is rational (i.e. maximizing expected utility) at every state in
the characteristic Γ-structure for µ. Accordingly, we define a Nash equilibrium
(in an LB(ΦΓ)-game) to be a mixed strategy profile µ such that Mµ |= RAT .
It is immediate that this definition generalizes the classical definition of Nash
equilibrium.
We note that there are other epistemic characterizations of Nash equilibrium
besides the one presented here (see, e.g., [3], which focuses on the role of a
common prior and common knowledge of “conjectures”). While in the classical
setting they all generate equivalent solution concepts, this may not be the case
in our more general model. We believe that investigating the solution concepts
that arise by teasing apart such classically equivalent notions is an interesting
and promising direction for future research.
In contrast to the classical setting, Nash equilibria are not guaranteed to exist
in general; indeed, this is the case for the indignant altruism game of Example
3.0.4.
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Proposition 4.2.1: There is no Nash equilibrium in the indignant altruism game.
Proof: We must show that for every mixed strategy profile
µ = (µA, µB) ∈ ∆({c,d})×∆({c,d}),
the corresponding characteristic Γ-structure Mµ 6|= RAT .
Suppose first that µA(c) > 0. Then Mµ |= ¬BB playA(d), which implies
that Alice’s utility at every state in Mµ coincides with the classical prisoner’s
dilemma, so she is not rational at any state where she cooperates. Since,
by definition, Mµ contains a state where Alice cooperates, we conclude that
Mµ 6|= RATA, so µ cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
Suppose instead that µA(c) = 0. ThenMµ |= BB playA(d), and so Alice, being
sure of this, is not rational at any state where she defects, since by definition she
is guaranteed a utility of −1 in that case. By definition, Mµ contains a state
where Alice defects (in fact, Alice defects in every state), so we can conclude as
above that Mµ 6|= RATA, which means that µ cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
Why does Nash equilibrium not exist in this example? Roughly speaking,
the utility functions in this game exhibit a kind of “discontinuity”: the utility
of defecting is −1 precisely when your opponent is 100% certain that you will
defect. However, as soon as this probability dips below 100%, no matter how
small the drop, the utility of defecting jumps up to at least 1.
Broadly speaking, this issue arises in L-games whenever L expresses a
coarse-grained notion of belief, such as the underlying language in this exam-
ple, which only contains belief modalities representing 100% certainty. How-
ever, since coarseness is a central feature we wish to model, the lack of existence
43
of Nash equilibria in general might be viewed as a problem with the notion of
Nash equilibrium itself, rather than a defect of the underlying language. Indeed,
the requirements that a mixed strategy profile must satisfy in order to qualify
as a Nash equilibrium are quite stringent: essentially, each player must evaluate
his choice of strategy subject to the condition that his choice is common knowledge! As
we have seen, this condition is not compatible with rationality when a player’s
preference is to do something unexpected.
More generally, this tension arises with any solution concept that requires
players to have common knowledge of the mixed strategies being played (the
“conjectures”, in the terminology of Aumann and Brandenburger [3]). In fact,
Proposition 4.2.1 relies only on second-order knowledge of the strategies: when-
ever Alice knows that Bob knows her play, she is unhappy. In particular, any
alternative epistemic characterization of Nash equilibrium that requires such
knowledge is subject to the same non-existence result. Furthermore, we can use
the same ideas to show that there is no correlated equilibrium [2] in the indignant
altruism game either (once we extend correlated equilibrium to our setting); this
follows from the fact that in a correlated equilibrium players must still have cor-
rect beliefs about the strategies their opponents might play, and these beliefs are
common knowledge.
All this is not to say that Nash equilibrium is a useless concept in this set-
ting, but merely that we should not expect a general existence theorem in the
context of belief-dependent preferences with coarse beliefs. For an example of
an LB(ΦΓ)-game in which Nash equilibria exist and are informative, we exam-
ine again the “trust game” of Example 3.0.5.
Proposition 4.2.2: In the trust game, the only Nash equilibrium in which Alice places
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positive weight on hand is the pure equilibrium (hand, share).
Proof: Suppose that
µ = (µA, µB) ∈ ∆({split,hand})×∆({keep, share})
is a Nash equilibrium with µA(hand) > 0. Then there is some state ω ∈ Mµ
at which Alice is rationally playing hand. Since Alice can rationally play hand
only if she believes with sufficient probability that Bob is playing share, there
must be some state ω′ ∈ Mµ at which Bob is playing share. Moreover, since by
assumption Mµ |= RAT , we know that at ω′ Bob is rationally playing share. But
Bob can rationally play share only if he believes with sufficient probability that
BA playB(share) holds. However, by definition of Mµ, if BA playB(share) holds
at any state, then it must hold at every state because in this case µB(share) =
1, on account of the fact that in a Nash equilibrium players’ beliefs about the
strategies of their opponents are always correct.
It is easy to see that when µB(share) = 1, the only rational play for Alice in
Mµ is hand, and that when µA(hand) = µB(share) = 1, we have Mµ |= RAT .
This establishes the desired result.
4.3 Rationalizability
Here we define rationalizability in language-based games in the same spirit as
we defined Nash equilibrium in Chapter 4.2: epistemically. As shown by Tan
and Werlang [26] and Brandenburger and Dekel [6], common belief of rational-
ity characterizes rationalizable strategies. Thus, we define rationalizability that
way here.
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Let LCB(ΦratΓ ) be the language generated by starting with the formulas in ΦΓ
and closing off under ∧, ¬, the unary operators Bi, i = 1, . . . , n, and CB. We
read CBϕ as “there is common belief of ϕ”. Extend [[·]]M to LCB(ΦratΓ ) by setting
[[CBϕ]]M :=
∞⋂
k=1
[[EBkϕ]]M ,
where
EBϕ ≡ B1ϕ ∧ · · · ∧Bnϕ, and
EBkϕ ≡ EB(EBk−1ϕ).
For convenience, we stipulate that EB0ϕ ≡ ϕ. We read EBϕ as “everyone
believes ϕ”. Thus, intuitively, CBϕ holds precisely when everyone believes ϕ,
everyone believes that everyone believes ϕ, and so on. We define a strategy σi ∈
Σi to be rationalizable (in an LB(ΦΓ)-game) if the formula play i(σi)∧CB(RAT )
is satisfiable in some Γ-structure.
Although there are no Nash equilibria in the indignant altruism game, as we
now show, every strategy is rationalizable.
Proposition 4.3.1: Every strategy in the indignant altruism game is rationalizable.
Proof: Consider the Γ-structure in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: A Γ-structure for indignant altruism.
The valuations of the primitive propositions at each of the four states are
labeled in the obvious way. Arrows labeled i based at state ω should be inter-
preted as pointing to all and only those states ω′ such that PRi(ω)(ω′) > 0 (in
particular, in this example, every probability measure assigns probability 1 to
some single state).
As discussed in Example 3.0.4, it is rational to cooperate in this game if you
believe that your opponent believes that you will defect, and it is rational to de-
fect if you believe that your opponent believes you will cooperate. Given this,
it is not difficult to check that RAT holds at each state of this Γ-structure; there-
fore, so does CB(RAT ). Thus, by definition, every strategy is rationalizable.
Does every language-based game admit a rationalizable strategy? Every
classical game does. This follows from the fact that every strategy in a Nash
equilibrium is rationalizable, together with Nash’s theorem that every (finite)
game has a Nash equilibrium (cf. [22]). In the language-based setting, while it
is immediate that every strategy in a Nash equilibrium is rationalizable, since
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Nash equilibria do not always exist, we cannot appeal to this argument.
In the classical setting, the existence of rationalizable strategies can also be
proved by defining a certain iterative deletion procedure and showing that it
always terminates in a nonempty set of strategy profiles, and that these profiles
are precisely the rationalizable ones. We provide a natural condition that guar-
antees that this type of approach also works for language-based games. More-
over, we show by example that when this condition does not hold, the existence
of rationalizable strategies is not guaranteed.
Perhaps the most straightforward kind of deletion procedure one might pro-
pose in our setting works roughly as follows: consider the set of all states in all
Γ-structures. Mark those states that fail to satisfy RAT . Next, mark those states
ω that include an already-marked state in the support of one of the player’s
probability measures PRi(ω). These are the states that fail to satisfy EB(RAT ).
Iterating this process, it is not difficult to see that the states marked at the kth
step are those that fail to satisfy EBk(RAT ). Thus, the only states that are never
marked are those that satisfyCB(RAT ). Moreover, the following lemma (which
will play an important role later) implies that at each finite stage of this proce-
dure, we are left with a nonempty set of unmarked states.
Lemma 4.3.2: EBk(RAT ) is satisfiable for all k ∈ N.
Unfortunately, it is not true in general that this procedure always termi-
nates after a finite number of iterations, nor is it clear how to go about showing
that any states remain unmarked in the limit, without already knowing that
CB(RAT ) is satisfiable. The problem here seems to be the unwieldy nature of
“the set of all states in all Γ-structures”. We therefore work with what is essen-
48
tially a projection of this set: the set of all situations.
Given any language L, we can topologize S(L) by taking as basic open sets
the collection {Uϕ : ϕ ∈ L}, where Uϕ := {S ∈ S(L) : ϕ ∈ S}. Thus, two
situations are in the same open set Uϕ just in case they both contain the formula
ϕ; intuitively, two situations are “close” if they have many formulas in common.
Given a set of formulas F and a formula ϕ, we write F |= ϕ, and say that F
entails ϕ, if every state that satisfies F also satisfies ϕ; in other words, F entails
ϕ when F ∪ {¬ϕ} is not satisfiable. A logic is said to be compact if, whenever
F |= ϕ, there is some finite subset F ′ ⊆ F such that F ′ |= ϕ.3
It is straightforward to check that S(L) is compact (as a topological space)
just in case L is compact (as a logic). Furthermore, it is well-known that the
KD45 belief logic is compact [5]. Unfortunately, compactness is not necessarily
preserved when we augment the logic with primitive propositions RAT i as in
Chapter 4.1—a player may fail to be rational for an “infinitary” reason. Take,
for instance, the deeply surprising proposal of Example 3.0.7. It is not hard to
see that
{playB(q)} ∪ {BB¬B̂A(B̂B B̂A)kplayB(p) : k ∈ N} |= ¬RATB.
However, no finite subset of this collection is sufficient to entail Bob’s irrational-
ity: there will always be some k so high that, should Alice “expect” a proposal
at this kth order of “expectation”, Bob is indeed rational not to propose. Games
with this type of infinitary structure can fail to have rationalizable strategies.
Proposition 4.3.3: The deeply surprising proposal game has no rationalizable strate-
gies.
3Equivalently, for every set of formulas F , F is satisfiable if and only if every finite subset of
F is satisfiable.
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Proof: Fix a Γ-structure M = (Ω, (si)i∈N , (PRi)i∈N) and suppose for contra-
diction that ω ∈ Ω is such that ω |= CB(RAT ). Let “expect∗” denote the in-
finitary notion of expectation at play in this example, and consider first the
case where Alice does not expect∗ a proposal at state ω: that is, for all k ∈ N,
ω |= ¬B̂A(B̂BB̂A)kplayB(p). Then, for all k ∈ N, ω |= BA(BBBA)k¬playB(p);
taking k = 0, it follows that PRA(ω)([[¬playB(p)]]M) = 1. Moreover, since
CB(RAT ) holds at ω, we know in fact that PRA(ω)([[¬playB(p)∧RATB]]M) = 1.
But if Bob is rationally not proposing at a state ω′, then he must at least
consider it possible that Alice expects∗ a proposal. That is, for each ω′ ∈
[[¬playB(p) ∧ RATB]]M , there is a k such that ω′ |= B̂B(B̂A(B̂BB̂A)kplayB(p)).
Thus, PRA(ω)(∪∞k=0[[(B̂BB̂A)k+1]]M) = 1. Since PRA(ω) is countably additive, it
follows that there is a k such that PRA(ω)([[(B̂BB̂A)k+1playB(p)]]M) > 0. Hence,
ω |= B̂A(B̂BB̂A)k+1playB(p), contradicting our original assumption. Thus we
have shown that any state whereCB(RAT ) holds is a state where Alice expects∗
a proposal.
So suppose now that Alice expects∗ a proposal at ω. It follows that there
exists some ω′ ∈ Ω with ω′ |= playB(p) ∧ CB(RAT ). But if Bob is rationally
playing p at ω′, he must consider it possible that Alice doesn’t expect∗ it; from
this it follows that there exists a state ω′′ ∈ Ω with ω′′ |= CB(RAT ) but where
Alice doesn’t expect∗ a proposal, which we have seen is impossible.
This completes the argument: CB(RAT ) is not satisfiable. It is worth noting
that this argument fails if we replace “expects∗” with “expects≤K”, where this
latter term is interpreted to mean (∀k ≤ K)[¬B̂A(B̂BB̂A)kplayB(p)].
We now provide a condition that guarantees the existence of rationalizable
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strategies:
(CR)
For all S ∈ S, if S |= ¬RAT then there is a
finite subset F ⊂ S such that F |= ¬RAT .
Theorem 4.3.4: (CR) implies that rationalizable strategies exist.
We think of S |= ¬RAT as saying that the situation S is not compatible with
rationality: there is no state satisfying S at which RATi holds for each player i.
Property (CR) then guarantees that there is some “finite witness” F ⊂ S to this
fact. In other words, given any situation not compatible with rationality, there is
a finite description of that situation that ensures this incompatibility. Note that
the deeply surprising proposal game fails to satisfy (CR).
How stringent of a requirement is the condition (CR)? A partial answer to
this question is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3.5: Every finitely-specified LB(ΦΓ)-game satisfies (CR).
Corollary 4.3.6: Every finitely-specified LB(ΦΓ)-game has a rationalizable strategy.
Since we expect to encounter finitely-specified games most often in practice,
this suggests that the games we are likely to encounter will indeed have ratio-
nalizable strategies.
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CHAPTER 5
CASE STUDY: SHOPPING FOR SHOES
In this chapter we take an in-depth look at an example that Ko˝szegi and
Rabin [15] (henceforth KR) analyze in detail: shopping for shoes. KR apply
their theory of reference-dependent preferences to study a typical consumer’s
decision-making process, illustrating several insights and predictions of their
formalism along the way. We do the same, modeling the interaction as an
LB(ΦΓ)-game and comparing this approach to that of KR. The development
in this chapter can easily be generalized to more a refined language such as
LΘB(ΦΓ); however, we choose to work with a minimal language in order to make
clear the surprising richness that even the coarsest representation of belief can
exhibit.
5.1 Setup
The game form Γ = ({C,R},ΣC ,ΣR) consists of two players: a consumer C
and a retailer R. As we are interested only in the consumer’s decisions and
motivations, we model the retailer’s preferences with a constant utility function;
in essence, R plays the role of “the environment”.
Let ΣR be a set of non-negative real numbers, the prices; p ∈ ΣR represents
the retailer setting the price of a pair shoes to be p units. The consumer’s choice
is essentially whether or not to buy the given pair of shoes. However, since we
model play as simultaneous, and whether or notC decides to buy might depend
on what R sets the price at, the strategies available to C should reflect this. Let
ΣC be a set of real numbers, the thresholds; t ∈ ΣC represents the threshold cost
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at which C is no longer willing to buy the shoes. An outcome of this game is
therefore a threshold-price pair (t, p) ∈ Σ; intuitively, the shoes are purchased
for price p if and only if t > p.
The consumer’s utility depends on the outcome of the game together with a
“reference level”. A reference level is like an imaginary outcome that the actual
outcome of the game is compared to, thereby generating sensations of gain or
loss. Roughly speaking, KR interpret the reference level as being determined
by a player’s expectations, that is, her (probabilistic) beliefs about outcomes.
Formally, they allow for stochastic reference levels given by probability mea-
sures on the set of outcomes; sensations of gain or loss with respect to stochastic
reference levels are calculated by integrating with respect to these probability
measures. By contrast, in our framework, beliefs can affect utility only insofar
as they can be expressed in the underlying language. The coarseness of the lan-
guage LB(ΦΓ) is therefore a departure from KR’s approach; nonetheless, we will
see that many of their insights also arise in our framework in a coarse setting
(and, of course, we can reproduce their results with a richer language).
To clarify our definition of utility as well as to conform to the exposition
given by KR as closely as possible, we begin by defining some auxiliary func-
tions. Following KR, we think of the outcome of the game as far as utility is
concerned as being divided into two dimensions, the first tracking the money
spent, and the second tracking the product obtained. As a separate matter, we
also think of utility itself as coming in two components: consumption utility,
which is akin to the usual notion in classical game theory depending solely on
the outcome, and gain-loss utility, the component that depends on the reference
level.
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The two dimensions of consumption utility are given by functions mi : Σ→
R defined by
m1(t, p) =
 −p if p < t0 if p ≥ t
and
m2(t, p) =
 1 if p < t0 if p ≥ t.
As KR do, we assume additive separability of consumption utility, so the function
m = m1 + m2 gives C’s total consumption utility. This function captures the
intuition that, when the price of the shoes is below the threshold for purchase,
C buys the shoes and therefore gets a total consumption utility of 1 − p: a sum
of the “intrinsic” value of the shoes to her (normalized to 1), and the loss of the
money she paid for them (−p). Otherwise, C neither spends any money nor gets
any shoes, so her utility is 0.
Next we define functions representing the two corresponding dimensions of
gain-loss utility, ni : Σ2 → R, by
ni(t, p | s, q) = µ(mi(t, p)−mi(s, q)),
where µ : R → R is a fixed function that we discuss shortly. The value
ni(t, p | s, q) should be thought of as the gain-loss utility (in dimension i) of the
outcome (t, p) given the reference level (s, q). Furthermore, as KR do, we as-
sume that gain-loss utility is a function of the difference between the consump-
tion utility of the actual outcome, mi(t, p), and the consumption utility of the
reference level, mi(s, q). Following KR, for the purposes of this example we let
µ(x) =
 ηx if x > 0ληx if x ≤ 0,
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where η < 0 and λ > 1. Thus, λ implements loss-aversion by ensuring that
any sense of loss is λ-times greater than the positive feeling associated with a
corresponding gain.
As with consumption utility, we assume that gain-loss utility is additively
separable, so the function n = n1 + n2 gives the total gain-loss utility. Finally,
C’s total utility u : Σ2 → R is given by
u(t, p | s, q) = m(t, p) + n(t, p | s, q),
the sum of her total consumption utility and her total gain-loss utility.
As mentioned, KR interpret the reference level as being determined by be-
liefs; indeed, this is the foundation of one of the main contributions of their
paper. We might therefore model C’s reference level as being entirely deter-
mined by her first-order beliefs about outcomes; for the time being, we adopt
this modeling assumption, although we explore a different option in Chapter
5.3. Note that under this assumption, in our framework a reference level (s, q)
must satisfy s = t, where t is the actual threshold chosen by C; this follows from
the fact that players are always sure of their own strategies. Thus, C’s reference
level is completely captured by the value q, namely, what she thinks the price
will be set at.
Having formalized a notion of utility comparing an outcome to a single ref-
erence level, we must extend this to account for uncertainty on the part of the
consumer. In other words, if a reference level is conceptualized as an expected
outcome, we must specify C’s utility when she considers more than one out-
come possible.
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Let ref C : S(LB(ΦΓ))→ 2ΣR be defined by
ref C(S) = {q ∈ ΣR : B̂C playR(q) ∈ S}.
This function extracts from a given LB(ΦΓ)-situation S the set of all prices q ∈
ΣR such that C considers it possible that R might play q. This set plays the same
role for us that a stochastic reference level G plays for KR; in a sense, ref C(S) is
the support of a distribution like G.
To incorporate the uncertainty expressed by the stochastic beliefs G into a
measure of utility, KR integrate u against G, yielding in essence a weighted
average. We can bypass the calculus and just take the average, defining uC :
S(LB(ΦΓ))→ R by
uC(S) = |ref C(S)|−1
∑
q∈ref C(S)
u(t, p | t, q),
where t = ρC(S) and p = ρR(S) are the strategies actually played by C and R in
the situation S, respectively.
Of course, this is far from the only way in which we might massage the set
ref C(S) into a utility function for C; for instance, analogously to the “pay raise”
of Example 3.0.6, we might stipulate that C’s reference level is given by her
highest price expectation:
u′C(S) = u(t, p | t,max(ref C(S))).
In order to parellel the definitions of KR as closely as possible, however, we
focus on utility as given by averaging reference levels.
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5.2 Predictions
The game form Γ, equipped with the utility function uC (as well as a constant
utility function uR), forms an LB(ΦΓ)-game. We now demonstrate that, despite
the coarseness of the underlying language, important predictions from KR’s
framework persist. Notably, we accomplish this without making use of the so-
lution concepts that they define, but instead with a basic assumption of ratio-
nality on the part of the consumer (as in Chapter 4.1). In Chapter 5.3, we explore
KR’s solution concepts of personal equilibrium and preferred personal equilibrium in
some detail.
We begin by considering the consumer’s behaviour under price certainty.
KR show that, in this case, the consumer’s preferred personal equilibrium is to
buy the shoes if the cost is below their intrisic value, p < 1, and not to buy the
shoes when p > 1.
Fix a Γ-structure M and suppose that ω is a state at which C is certain that
the shoes will be offered for price p:
PRC(ω)([[playR(p)]]M) = 1.
A rational consumer, by definition, seeks to maximize expected utility; in this
case, as she has no doubt about the price of the shoes, her expected utility on
playing t ∈ T is simply u(t, p | t, p). This is because in every state she considers
possible both the actual price and the expected price are p. More formally, for
every ω′ ∈ PRC [ω] we know that ref C(S(ω′)) = {p}, and therefore
uˆC(t, ω
′) = u(t, p | t, p) =
 1− p if p < t0 if p ≥ t.
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It follows that in the absence of price uncertainty, a rational consumer chooses a
threshold t > p (that is, chooses to buy the shoes at the expected price) whenever
p < 1, and chooses a threshold t ≤ p whenever p > 1; for instance, choosing
t = 1 accomodates both of these restrictions at once. Thus, in this model, when
a rational consumer is certain of the price, sensations of gain or loss do not enter
into the picture.
Next we consider a case of price uncertainty. Fix a Γ-structure M and sup-
pose that ω is a state at which C is considers it possible that the shoes will
be offered at one of two prices: pL and pM , where pL < pM . In other words,
ref C(S(ω)) = {pL, pM}. Suppose also that T = {tL, tH}, where pL < tL < pM <
tH . Thus, the two strategies available to C constitute a choice between buying at
price pM or not, while buying at price pL is a foregone conclusion. As we saw, if
the consumer were certain that the price would be pM , she could rationally play
tH just in case pM ≤ 1. Under uncertainty, however, the rational threshold for
buying can change.
By definition, C’s expected utility is some convex combination of her utility
in case R plays pM and her utility in case R plays pL. We analyze each case in
turn.
First consider the case where R plays pM . Then C’s utility for playing tL is
equal to
m(tL, pM) +
1
2
[n(tL, pM | tL, pL) + n(tL, pM | tL, pM)],
her consumption utilitym plus the average gain-loss utility for the two reference
levels she considers possible. This evaluates to
0 +
1
2
[µ(0− (−pL)) + µ(0− 1) + 0] = ηpL − λη
2
.
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Similarly, C’s utility for playing tH is
m(tH , pM) +
1
2
[n(tH , pM | tH , pL) + n(tH , pM | tH , pM)],
which evaluates to
1− pM + −λη(pM − pL)
2
.
It follows that playing tH yields a higher payoff than playing tL precisely when
pM < 1 + pL · η(λ− 1)
2 + λη
.
In the case where R plays pL, analogous calculations show that tH is preferred
to tL precisely when
pM > 1− pL(λ− 1).
Since, as noted above, C’s expected utility at ω is some convex combination of
her utility in the two cases just analysed, we can see that whenever
1− pL(λ− 1) < pM < 1 + pL · η(λ− 1)
2 + λη
, (5.1)
expected utility is maximized by choosing tH . In particular, buying the shoes
for a price pM > 1 can be rational; moreover, the extra amount pM − 1 that it is
always rational to pay is determined by the upper bound of the inequality (5.1),
which is increasing in pL. Intuitively, the higher the price pL the consumer was
willing to buy the shoes at no matter what, the less of a loss it feels like to pay
a little bit extra. Equivalently, the lower the price pL, the more of a loss it feels
like by comparison to pay the higher price pM . This is the “comparison effect”
found by KR.
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5.3 Intention
As we have seen, under price certainty, the consumer cannot rationally purchase
the shoes if they are being offered at a price p > 1. This corresponds to a predic-
tion of KR: in their terminology, buying if p < 1 and only if p ≤ 1 is the unique
preferred personal equilibrium under price certainty. However, the weaker of the
two solution concepts they propose tells a different story. Still assuming price
certainty, KR show that both buying for sure and not buying for sure (provided
the price is not too high or low) are personal equilibria for the consumer.
The idea has a certain appeal: if the consumer is somehow set on a purchase,
then a failure to follow through might generate a sense of loss that can overcome
a certain amount of overcharging. In essence, people will pay extra to avoid
disappointment. Similarly, according to KR, people will pass up a good deal if
they had their mind set in advance on saving their money.
KR work in a dynamic setting where this intuition can be cashed out tempo-
rally. First, the consumer forms an expectation that she will buy the shoes before
she even gets to the store. Upon arrival, she realizes (say) that they are more ex-
pensive than she had thought, and updates her beliefs accordingly. However,
crucially, she does not update her reference level vis-a-vis her intention to buy. In-
tuitively, as far as being disappointed goes, her reference level is determined by
her old expectation to buy. Indeed, when unexpected calamity or fortune be-
falls someone, they typically do not update their expectations immediately and
proceed as if the status quo has merely been maintained.
In what follows, we sketch a formalism within which we can tell this type
of story; in keeping with the theme of this work, the idea boils down to the
60
right choice of underlying language. Notably, however, the language we em-
ploy is not fundamentally temporal in nature. This suggests, we feel, that the
corresponding notion at play in KR’s work, although presented in a dynamic
setting, is better viewed as an instance of a more general construction. We call
it intention.
Let
ΦintΓ = ΦΓ ∪ {inti(σi) : i ∈ N, σi ∈ Σi},
and consider the language LB(ΦintΓ ). We read inti(σi) as “player i intends to
play σi”. An intentional Γ-structure is a Γ-structure M equipped with additional
functions ιi : Ω → Σi called the intention functions such that whenever ω′ ∈
PRi[ω], we have ιi(ω′) = ιi(ω). This condition ensures that each player is sure of
his own intentions. A valuation function [[·]]M is defined recursively on LB(ΦintΓ )
as before, with the additional clause
[[inti(σi)]]M := {ω ∈ Ω : ιi(ω) = σi}.
This is a modest extension of the langauge LB(ΦΓ); all we have done is add a
second batch of primitive propositions behaving very much the same way that
the original formulas play i(σi) behave. One important difference between the
two lies in how players consider them counterfactually, namely, in comparing
expected utilities. Informally, players can evaluate what their utility would be if
they were to play a different strategy, but not what their utility would be if they
were to intend to play a different strategy.
In Chapter 5.2, we noted that our interpretation of gain-loss utility
n(t, p | s, q) entailed that t = s. Here we alter this interpretation: we assume
instead that the reference level s is determined at a state ω by the player’s inten-
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tion at that state, rather than the actual strategy being played (which determines
t). Accordingly, we define uC : S(LB(ΦintΓ ))→ R by
uC(S) = |ref C(S)|−1
∑
q∈ref C(S)
u(t, p | s, q),
where t = ρC(S), p = ρR(S), and s is the unique element of ΣC satisfying
intC(s) ∈ S.
We now consider a scenario where there is price certainty. Fix an intentional
Γ-structure M and suppose that ω is a state at which C is certain that the shoes
will be offered for price p. Suppose also that ιC(ω) = s and s > p. In other
words, at state ω, C intends to buy the shoes.
A rational consumer, as always, seeks to maximize expected utility. Since she
is uncertain about neither the price of the shoes nor her intention to buy them,
her expected utility on playing t ∈ T is given by u(t, p | s, p). Let tL, tH ∈ T be
such that tL < p < tH . It is easy to calculate
u(tL, p | s, p) = ηp− λη
and
u(tH , p | s, p) = 1− p;
therefore, a rational consumer will choose tH rather than tL just in case
p <
1 + λη
1 + η
.
Thus, intending to buy makes it rational to buy even for some prices p > 1. In
a situation where s < p, on the other hand, a similar calculation shows that a
rational consumer will choose tH over tL only when
p <
1 + η
1 + λη
,
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so intending not to buy makes is rational not to buy even for some prices p < 1.
These findings duplicate those of KR.
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CHAPTER 6
BAYESIAN GAMES
A Bayesian game is a model of strategic interaction among players whose
preferences can depend on factors beyond the strategies they choose to play.
These factors are often taken to be characteristics of the players themselves, such
as whether they are industrious or lazy, how strong they are, or how they value
certain objects. Such characteristics can be relevant in a variety of contexts: a job
interview, a fight, an auction, etc.
To capture the factors beyond strategies, a Bayesian game associates with
each player a set of possible types of that player. These types can be thought of
as encoding private information about the players. At a high level, we might
imagine translating an LB(ΦΓ)-game into a Bayesian game by specifying, for
each player i and situation S, player i’s type in S to be the collection ti(S) = {ϕ :
Biϕ ∈ S}; in other words, player i’s type is identified with the set of descriptions
she is sure of. In a Bayesian game, utility depends on type, and in principle
this kind of translation might allow one to transform situation-dependence into
type-dependence, thereby capturing LB(ΦΓ)-games in the Bayesian framework.
Are situations just a logical rendering of types?1
The situation is not quite so simple. There are standard notions of Nash
equilibrium in Bayesian games. There are standard conditions that guarantee
the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for a general class of Bayesian
games. By contrast, Proposition 4.2.1 shows that some quite simple language-
based games do not have a Nash equilibrium. So, however we translate these
language-based games to Bayseian games, the resulting Bayesian game must
1We are indebted to Aviad Heifetz for suggesting this line of inquiry.
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violate the conditions that guarantee the existence of an equilibrium.
This raises the obvious question of where exactly the intuition above goes
wrong (or, at least, how it might result in a Bayesian game that does not sat-
isfy the conditions needed for existence of an equilibrium). It turns out that
the real issue is whether or not types encode strategies. If they do not, we find
the Bayesian formalism is simply not rich enough to accommodate language-
based games. This is because any language that can express players’ beliefs
about strategies (like LB(ΦΓ)) yields a game in which preferences can depend
on such beliefs; by contrast, in a Bayesian game preferences depend on types,
but if types do not encode strategies then they also fail to encode beliefs about
strategies. On the other hand, if we do allow types to encode strategies, then
the standard arguments proving the existence of an equilibrium break down.
Roughly speaking, the strategy that a player i should play at a type ti in equi-
librium might not be the one that is encoded in ti.
These considerations lead us to associate two strategies with each player, an
“intended” and an “actual” strategy. We can think of the intended strategy of
player i at type ti as being the one encoded in his type, while the actual strategy
is the one that he plays say in a given situation. As we show by example, this
distinction between actual and intended strategies is quite useful.
In this chapter, we formalize some of the intuitions above, and do a prelimi-
nary investigation into these issues.
6.1 Definitions
A Bayesian game is a tuple B = (N, (Σi, Ti, pi, ui)i∈N) where
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• N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players;
• Σi is the set of strategies available to player i;
• Ti is the measurable space of types of player i;
• pi : Ti → ∆(T−i) associates with each type ti of player i a probability
measure pi(ti) on T−i representing player i’s beliefs about the types of her
opponents;
• ui : Σ× T → R is player i’s utility function.
As we said, types can be thought of as encoding private information about
the players.2 This information is payoff-relevant in the sense that the utility
functions depend on it as well as the actual strategies that are played. For ex-
ample, the resolution of a battle between two armies may depend not only on
what maneuvers they each perform (i.e. the strategies they employ), but also on
how large or well-trained they were to begin with (i.e. their types). For a differ-
ent kind of example: how happy one is with the results of an auction depends
not only on who got what (determined by the bids that were placed, i.e. the
strategies), but also on how the objects up for auction are valued (participants
may value the same objects differently, which can be encoded by their types).
It is sometimes helpful to view a type ti ∈ Ti as determining the function
ui(· , ti, ·) : Σ × T−i → R, representing player i’s preferences over the outcomes
and types of her opponents. In other words, although ti affects player i’s utility,
instead of thinking of player i as preferring to be one type rather than another,
we think of her type as determining her preferences. However, this is a concep-
tual difference that plays little role in the formal developement.
2One can also introduce an extra player, “nature”, whose type encodes information about
“the world”.
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Another key feature of the types formalism is that types encode beliefs via the
functions pi. It is often assumed that for all ti ∈ Ti, the measure pi(ti) is obtained
from some fixed probability measure pii ∈ ∆(T ) by conditioning on ti; in other
words, each player’s beliefs are obtained by conditioning her “prior beliefs” pii
on her own private information. When pi1 = pi2 = · · · = pin, we say that the
players have a common prior; this condition is also frequently assumed in the
literature.
Of course, a player’s beliefs may not depend on her type in any essential
way; for example, there is no reason why a commander’s beliefs about the size
of her opponent’s army should depend on the size of her own army. But such
a dependency can be encoded if desired: perhaps the commander of a very
well-trained army tends to overestimate the discipline of her opponent’s forces.
Modeling beliefs about types is crucial for the analysis of many games. Con-
sider once again an auction: several players place bids on several items, and a
strategy for player i is identified with the collection of bids she places. As noted,
different players may value the items up for auction differently; classically, we
could simply encode this in the utility functions of the players. However, this
leaves out an important aspect of the auction: the players may be uncertain
about how their opponents value the items, and this information may be quite
relevant to their own bidding strategies. Such a scenario, where the players are
uncertain about the utility functions of their opponents, is a canonical example
of the kind of strategic interaction that Bayesian games are designed to model.
The types formalism captures this aspect of an auction simply and cleanly by
encoding the players’ valuations of the items in their types.
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Of special interest for our purposes, the expressive power of the types for-
malism extends even further than this: because types encode beliefs, and utility
depends on types, in principle Bayesian games can capture “psychological” ef-
fects in preferences, namely, preferences that depend on beliefs. For instance,
one can define a Bayesian game in which a player’s preferred strategy depends
on whether or not her opponent is certain of her type. Given these consider-
ations, it is natural to wonder to what extent language-based games are sub-
sumed by the Bayesian framework.
6.2 Equilibrium and surprise
Part of the value of Bayesian games lies in the fact that a generalized notion of
Nash equilibrium can be defined in this framework. A Bayesian Nash equi-
librium of the Bayesian game B is a profile of behaviour rules βi : Ti → ∆(Σi)
such that for each player i and each type ti, the mixed strategy βi(ti) maximizes
player i’s expected utility given the beliefs pi(ti) and the behaviour rules β−i of
the other players. Note that the beliefs pi(ti) that player i has about the types
of her opponents yield beliefs about the strategies of her opponents via the be-
haviour rules β−i. If we think of mixed strategies as representing conscious ran-
domizations, we can think of this analogously to a classical Nash equilibrium,
except here players choose mixtures that depend on their types, and rather than
everyone knowing the mixture their opponents will use, everyone knows the
mixtures that each type of their opponents will use. On the other hand, if we
view a mixed strategy of player i as representing the common conjecture of her
opponents about which (pure) strategy she will choose, then in a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium, although the players may not have a common conjecture about
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their opponents’ strategies, they do have a common conjecture about their op-
ponents’ strategies given their types (about which their beliefs may differ).
Every Bayesian game with finite strategy and type spaces admits a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium [13]. By contrast, not every language-based game has a Nash
equilibrium (Proposition 4.2.1). What explains this discrepancy?
The key impediment to the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the indignant
altrusim game is the players’ desire to surprise their opponents. Consider an
arbitrary two-player game between Alice and Bob in which Bob prefers to play
a strategy that Alice does not believe he will play (the exact interpretation of
“does not believe” here—that is, whether it means “assigns low probability to”,
“assigns 0 probability to”, or something else—is not important at the moment).
Can a Bayesian game capture such a preference?
Speaking at a high level, Bob’s utility function must be defined so that it as-
signs higher values to precisely those strategy-type profile pairs in which Bob’s
own strategy is unexpected with respect to the beliefs encoded by Alice’s type.
But this is easier said than done: types encodes beliefs about types, not about
strategies, so Alice’s type does not inherently specify her degree of belief about
any of Bob’s particular strategies. Though it is true that in the context of a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium types induce beliefs about strategies (via the be-
haviour rules), this is far from sufficient for our purposes: we should be able to
represent Bob’s preference for surprise independently of any equilibrium con-
straints.
Thus, the discrepancy between equilibrium existence results in language-
based versus Bayesian games is simply due to the fact that the latter is not ex-
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pressive enough to represent the kinds of preferences that block equilibria in
the former. Of course, this immediately begs the question: can we correct this
deficiency? Types, in virtue of their abstract nature, are often conceived of as
“catch-all” objects capable of encoding essentially anything that might be rele-
vant to player preferences. However, while faith in the expressive power of the
types formalism itself is not necessarily misplaced, in a Bayesian game enrich-
ing the type space can change the analysis in a fundamental way.
A natural enrichment is to encode strategies in types, so that each type ti
determines not only the preferences and beliefs of player i but also the strategy
si(ti) that she is employing. In this case, of course, beliefs about types yield be-
liefs about strategies, circumventing the obstacle raised above and allowing us
to model players who wish to surprise their opponents. But now the definition
of Bayesian Nash equilibrium is muddied, since a behaviour rule also associates
a strategy with a type. What is the relationship between si(ti) and βi(ti)?
6.3 Intended strategies
A Bayesian game with intentions I is a Bayesian game B equipped with addi-
tional functions si : Ti → Σi associating with each type ti of player i an intended
strategy si(ti). Intuitively, we might think of si(ti) as the strategy that a player
of type ti is planning to play (though may ultimately decide not to), or perhaps
as the “default” strategy for that type. Regardless, as observed above, the func-
tions si allow us to derive beliefs about strategies from beliefs about types, even
out of equilibrium. In particular, we can represent Bob’s preference to surprise
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Alice by defining Bob’s utility function as follows:
uB(σ, t) =
 1 if pA(tA)(s
−1
B (σB)) = 0
0 otherwise.
In other words, Bob is happiest when the strategy σB that he is actually playing
is such that Alice’s type tA considers it to be probability zero (remember that
pA(tA) is a measure on types, which is why we apply it to s−1B (σB), i.e. the set of
types for Bob whose intended strategy is σB).
A Nash equilibrium of I is a profile of behaviour rules βi : Ti → ∆(Σi) that
is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of B and such that, for each i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti,
si(ti) ∈ supp(βi(ti)), where supp denotes the support of the measure (i.e. the
set of all strategies of positive probability). Said differently, a Nash equilibrium
of I is just a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which the common conjecture about
what strategy a given type ti is playing assigns positive probability to that type’s
intended strategy si(ti).
Not every Bayesian game with intentions admits a Nash equilibrium. For in-
stance, let I be such that ΣA = {∗}, ΣB = {σB, σ′B}, TA = {tA, t′A}, TB = {tB, t′B},
pA(tA) is the point-mass measure concentrated on tB, pA(t′A) is the point-mass
measure concentrated on t′B, pB(tB) is the point-mass measure concentrated
on tA, pB(t′B) is the point-mass measure concentrated on t
′
A, sB(tB) = σB,
sB(t
′
B) = σ
′
B, and uB is defined as above. Then we have
uB(∗, σB, tA, tB) = 0 < 1 = uB(∗, σ′B, tA, tB),
and it follows that if βB is part of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then βB(tB)
must be the pure strategy σ′B (or else Bob’s type tB is not maximizing expected
utility). On the other hand, since sB(tB) = σB, such a behaviour rule βB cannot
be part of a Nash equilibrium for I. Thus, I has no Nash equilibrium.
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It should not be terribly surprising that Bayesian games with intentions do
not always have Nash equilibria: such a framework can capture the desire to
surprise, and we have seen (Example 3.0.4 and Chapter 4.2) that this kind of
preference is intuitively at odds with the notion of Nash equilibrium. But aside
from modeling the desire to surprise, incorporating “intention” into games is of
interest in its own right. In some cases a player may have a “default” course of
action, a strategy that is distinguised from the others—perhaps deviating from
it incurs a small cost . We also saw in Chapter 5.3 that a notion of intention is
useful for capturing KR’s personal equilibrium solution concept. More generally,
representing intention can be important in contexts where the distinction be-
tween present plans and future actions is of import. Example 3.0.8, for instance,
might be viewed as analyzing certain kinds of procrastination as the overvalu-
ing of intended actions. Further research in this area seems promising.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
Language-based games generalize classical games by replacing outcomes
with situations as the objects of preference. The underlying language deter-
mines the extent of this generalization. We saw, for example, that situations
correspond exactly to outcomes with the right choice of underlying language.
Language-based games also generalize psychological games. Broadly speak-
ing, psychological game theory is concerned with cases where the beliefs of the
players are relevant to their preferences; in this informal sense, any language-
based game where the underlying language expresses the beliefs of the players
in some way is an instance of a psychological game. More formally, however,
psychological games allow the players’ utility functions to depend on beliefs in
a continuous way, so to fully subsume this theory requires an underlying lan-
guage rich enough to do the same, such as the language L[0,1]B (ΦΓ) defined in
Example 3.0.5.
In this paper, we have focussed primarily on the language LB(ΦΓ), with oc-
casional forays into richer representations of belief (Example 3.0.5) and notions
of “intention” (Example 3.0.8, Chapter 5.3, Chapter 6.3). Further investigation
into the role of intention in decision making, and particularly its connection to
procrastination, seems promising. Moreover, there are several other natural ex-
tensions of the underlying language worthy of study. Temporal logics [16], for
example, offer an appealing avenue for extending language-based games to a
dynamic setting. Logics of awareness [12], on the other hand, offer a potential
route by which to incorporate uncertainty about the underlying language into the
game. By a slight generalization of the current framework, we can assign dif-
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ferent players distinct underlying languages at each state, which allows each
player i to be uncertain about what language his opponents’ preferences are de-
fined over. Indeed, reasoning about how opponents conceptualize the world
insofar as their preferences are concerned is quite relevant to a variety of strate-
gic interactions; it is, for instance, presumably what is at play when retailers
set prices like $2.99 rather than $3, exploiting the “rounding error” consumers
typically make (Example 3.0.1).
Finally, as we have emphasized (Examples 3.0.1, 3.0.2, and 3.0.3), coarseness
can be a powerful tool in the resolution of apparent paradoxes of human deci-
sion making. Coarseness in this sense can be viewed as an implementation of
bounded rationality: players do not represent the world in all its gory detail, but
rather, they systematically collapse certain distinctions by subsuming them un-
der the same description. While the notion of bounded rationality is certainly
not new, studying it through the lens of language provides an intuitive and sim-
ple mechanism with which a wide variety of decision problems can be analyzed.
Moreover, the technical advantages of this implementation are apparent in, for
example, equilibrium analyses that do not depend on continuity of the utility
functions, such as Corollary 4.3.6.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS
Proposition 4.1.1: For each i ∈ N , the map ~ρi : S → Σi × S−i defined by
~ρi(S) = (ρi(S), ρ−i(S)) is a bijection.
Proof:
Fix i ∈ N . To show that ~ρi is surjective, it suffices to show that given a
situation S and a strategy σi ∈ Σi, there exists a situation S ′ such that ρ−i(S ′) =
ρ−i(S), and ρi(S ′) = σi. Let M be a Γ-structure with a state ω such that (M,ω) |=
S; we will find the desired S ′ by constructing a new Γ-structure M ′ in which,
intuitively, there is a state that is just like ω except that player i is playing σi.
Define Ω˜ = Ω × {1, 2}. For each ω′ ∈ Ω, set s˜i(ω′, 2) = σi; for (j, k) 6= (i, 2),
define s˜j(ω′, k) = sj(ω′). Similarly, for each ω′ ∈ Ω, let P˜Ri(ω′, 2) be the measure
on Ω×{2} induced by PRi(ω′) by the natural correspondence; for (j, k) 6= (i, 2),
let P˜Rj(ω′, k) be the measure on Ω × {1} induced by PRj(ω′) by the natural
correspondence.
It is not hard to check that M˜ = (Ω˜, (s˜i)i∈N , (P˜Ri)i∈N) is a Γ-structure. Intu-
itively, it contains a “copy” of M in the component corresponding to Ω × {1},
while the component corresponding to Ω× {2} is just like M except that player
i is playing σi at all states. It is now easy to show by induction on the structure
of formulas that if ϕ is i-independent, then (M,ω′) |= ϕ iff (M˜, (ω′, 2)) |= ϕ and
that, for all formulas ϕ, (M,ω′) |= ϕ iff (M˜, (ω′, 1)) |= ϕ. Taking S ′ = S(ω, 2)
therefore yields the desired result.
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Now we show that ~ρi is injective; for this it suffices to show that if S, S ′ ∈ S
are distinct situations with ρ−i(S) = ρ−i(S ′), then ρi(S) 6= ρi(S ′). This follows
easily from the following claim, which we prove by structural induction: for all
formulas ϕ, if ϕ is not i-independent, then the subsets Xϕ, Yϕ ⊆ Σi defined by
Xϕ := {σi : ϕ 6|= ¬play i(σi)}
Yϕ := {σi : ¬ϕ 6|= ¬play i(σi)}
are disjoint. In other words, whenever ϕ is not i-independent, the set of strate-
gies for player i compatible with ϕ is disjoint from the set of strategies compati-
ble with ¬ϕ. Now if S and S ′ are distinct situations with ρ−i(S) = ρ−i(S ′), then
they must differ on some formula ϕ that is not i-independent. Therefore, by the
above, we can conclude that ρi(S) 6= ρi(S ′), proving injectivity.
For the base case, suppose ϕ = play j(σj). If j 6= i then this formula is i-
independent and we are done; otherwise, it is easy to see that Xplayi(σi) = {σi}
and Yplayi(σi) = Σi {σi}, which are certainly disjoint. The inductive step for
negation follows easily from the observation that X¬ϕ = Yϕ and Y¬ϕ = Xϕ. If
the result holds for ϕ and ψ, then since
Xϕ∧ψ ⊆ Xϕ ∩Xψ
and
Yϕ∧ψ = X¬ϕ∨¬ψ = X¬ϕ ∪X¬ψ = Yϕ ∪ Yψ,
it follows that Xϕ∧ψ and Yϕ∧ψ are disjoint, which establishes the inductive step
for conjunction. The inductive step for Bj , j 6= i, is trivial since the resulting
formula is i-independent. Finally, note that whenever ϕ |= ¬play i(σi), we also
have Biϕ |= Bi¬play i(σi), and so Biϕ |= ¬play i(σi). It follows that XBiϕ ⊆ Xϕ,
and similarly YBiϕ ⊆ Yϕ, from which disjointness follows.
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Lemma 4.3.2: EBk(RAT ) is satisfiable for all k ∈ N.
Proof: The idea is to construct a Γ-structure that is particularly well-behaved
with respect to alterations of its strategy function; this will allow us to modify a
given strategy function in such a way as to ensure that the players are rational
at certain states.
Let T be the set of all finite words on the alphabet N (the set of players),
excluding those words in which any letter appears consecutively:
T := {w ∈ N∗ : (∀i < |w| − 1)[w(i) 6= w(i+ 1)]}.
Thus T can be viewed as a tree whose root node λ (the empty word) has n = |N |
children, while every other node has n − 1 children (one for each letter in N
aside from the last letter of the current node). This will be our state space.
Given any nonempty word w, let `(w) := w(|w| − 1), the last letter in w.
Define PRi(w) := δsucci(w), the point-mass probability measure concentrated on
succi(w) ∈ T , where (taking w · i to be the result of appending i the end of w)
succi(w) :=

i if w = λ
w · i if `(w) 6= i
w otherwise.
It is easy to see that the frame (i.e., Γ-structure without the strategy function
s = (si)i∈N ) F = (T,PR1, . . . ,PRn) satisfies conditions (P1) through (P3); in
particular, (P3) follows from the observation that succi is idempotent.
Note that, given strategy functions s, (F, s) is a Γ-structure. Our goal is to
define strategy functions s on T in such a way as to ensure that ((F, s), λ) |=
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EBk(RAT ). Note that ((F, s), λ) |= EBk(RAT ) just in case ((F, s), w) |= RAT for
every word w with |w| ≤ k. We prove that this can be arranged by induction on
k. More precisely, we prove the following statement by induction on k:
For all k ∈ N and s : T → Σ, there exists an s′ : T → Σ such that
(i) for all w with |w| > k + 1, s′(w) = s(w);
(ii) for all w with |w| = k + 1 and all i 6= `(w), s′i(w) = si(w);
(iii) for all w with |w| ≤ k, ((F, s′), w) |= RAT .
The additional assumptions (i) and (ii) in this statement allow us to apply
the inductive hypothesis without fear of causing RAT to fail at nodes where we
previously established that it held.
For the base case k = 0, let s be a given strategy function. For each i ∈ N ,
let σi ∈ BRi(λ) (recall that the best response function depends on the state).
Define s′(λ) := (σ1, . . . , σn). In order to satisfy (P4), we must also insist that for
each j ∈ N , s′j(λ · j) = σj . Otherwise, let s′ agree with s. Then it is easy to
see that ((F, s′), λ) |= RAT , since we have altered each player’s strategy at λ so
as to ensure its rationality. It is also clear from construction that condition (i) is
satisfied, and moreover for each j ∈ N and each i 6= j we have s′i(λ ·j) = si(λ ·j),
so condition (ii) is satisfied as well. This completes the proof for the base case.
For the inductive step, assume the statement holds for k, and let s be a given
strategy function. Roughly speaking, we first modify s so that RAT holds at all
words of length k + 1, and then appeal to the inductive hypothesis to further
modify the strategy function so that RAT holds at all words of length ≤ k. For
each word w of length k + 1, and for each i 6= `(w), choose σi ∈ BRi(w) and
redefine s so that player i is playing σi at w and at w · i. Call the resulting
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strategy function s′. Similarly to the base case, it is easy to see that for each w of
length k + 1 and i 6= `(w), we have ((F, s′), w) |= RATi.
Applying the inductive hypothesis to s′, we obtain a new strategy function
s′′ such that for all w with |w| ≤ k, ((F, s′′), w) |= RAT . It follows that for
each word w of length k and each i ∈ N , ((F, s′′), succi(w)) |= RATi, since
PRj(w) = PRj(succi(w)). Moreover, from conditions (i) and (ii) we can deduce
that the property we arranged above for words w of length k + 1, namely that
((F, s′), w) |= RATi for each i 6= `(w), is preserved when we switch to the strat-
egy function s′′. Moreover, if w has length k + 1 and i = `(w), so that w = w′ · i,
then ((F, s′′), w) |= RAT i since ((F, s′′), w′) |= RATi by the inductive hypothesis.
Putting these facts together, we see that for each word w of length k+1, we have
((F, s′′), w) |= RAT . Thus for all w with |w| ≤ k + 1 we have ((F, s′′), w) |= RAT ;
conditions (i) and (ii) are straightforward to verify. This completes the induc-
tion.
Theorem 4.3.4 (CR) implies that rationalizable strategies exist.
Proof: Assuming (CR), we define an iterative deletion procedure on situations.
First, let
R = {S ∈ S : S 6|= ¬RAT}.
Thus, S ∈ R precisely when S is compatible with rationality; that is, when
S ∪ {RAT} is satisfiable. Condition (CR) has a particularly nice topological
formulation in terms ofR.
Lemma A.0.1: (CR) holds if and only ifR is closed in S.
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Proof: Suppose S /∈ R. Then, by definition, S |= ¬RAT , so (CR) guarantees
that there is some finite subset F ⊂ S such that F |= ¬RAT . In fact, since S is
maximal, it easy to see that the formula
ϕS :=
∧
ψ∈F
ψ
is itself an element of S, so without loss of generality we can replace the set F
with the single formula ϕS . UϕS is open, by definition. Moreover, UϕS ∩ R = ∅,
since any set S ′ ∈ UϕS contains ϕS , and therefore entails ¬RAT . Since S ∈ UϕS ,
this establishes thatR is closed.
Conversely, suppose that R is closed in S , and let S ∈ S be such that S |=
¬RAT . Then S /∈ R, so there is some basic open set Uϕ such that S ∈ Uϕ and
Uϕ ∩ R = ∅. Thus ϕ ∈ S, and any situation that contains ϕ must entail ¬RAT ,
from which it follows that ϕ |= ¬RAT .
Having defined those situations not compatible with rationality, we next de-
fine the iterative portion of the deletion procedure, designed to yield all and
only those situations compatible with common belief of rationality.
By Lemma A.0.1, R is closed, so we can express its complement as a union
of basic open sets: let I ⊂ LB(ΦΓ) be such that
R = S −
⋃
ϕ∈I
Uϕ.
Note that, by definition, S is not compatible with rationality just in case S con-
tains some formula in I . Roughly speaking, we can think of I as an exhaustive
list of the ways in which rationality might fail. We therefore define
R(1) = {S ∈ R : (∀i ∈ N)(∀ϕ ∈ I)[Bi¬ϕ ∈ S]}.
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Intuitively, R(1) is the set of situations that are not only compatible with ratio-
nality, but in which each player believes that the situation is compatible with
rationality (remember that “rationality” is being used here as a shorthand for
“everyone is rational”). If we set
I(1) = {B̂iϕ : i ∈ N and ϕ ∈ I},
then we can expressR(1) more succintly as
R(1) = R−
⋃
ψ∈I(1)
Uψ.
This also makes it clear that R(1) is closed in S. More generally, let I(0) = I and
R(0) = R; for each k ≥ 1, set
I(k) = {B̂iϕ : i ∈ N and ϕ ∈ I(k−1)},
and define
R(k) = R(k−1) −
⋃
ψ∈I(k)
Uψ.
It is straightforward to check that this definition agrees with our original defini-
tion ofR(1) and I(1). Moreover, observe that
R(0) ⊇ R(1) ⊇ R(2) ⊇ · · ·
is a nested, decreasing sequence of closed subsets of S. Since S is compact,
a collection of closed sets with the finite intersection property1 has nonempty
intersection.
Lemma A.0.2: For all k ∈ N and S ∈ S , if S ∪ {EBk(RAT )} is satisfiable, then
S ∈ R(k).
1Recall that a collection of sets has the finite intersection property just in case every finite sub-
collection has nonempty intersection.
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Proof: The proof proceeds by induction on k. For the base case k = 0, we
must show that if S ∪ {RAT} is satisfiable, then S ∈ R, which is precisely the
definition ofR.
Now suppose inductively that the statement holds for k − 1, and let S ∈
S(LB(ΦΓ)) be such that S∪{EBk(RAT )} is satisfiable. Then S∪{EBk−1(RAT )}
is also satisfiable, so by the inductive hypothesis we know that S ∈ R(k−1).
Therefore, by definition of R(k), the only way we could have S /∈ R(k) is if
B̂iϕ ∈ S for some i ∈ N and ϕ ∈ I(k−1). Suppose for contradiction that this is so.
By assumption, there is some Γ-structure M = (Ω, (si)i∈N , (PRi)i∈N) and
some ω ∈ Ω such that ω |= S ∪ {EBk(RAT )}. Furthermore, since B̂iϕ ∈ S,
we must have PRi(ω)([[ϕ]]M) > 0. However, for a state ω′ ∈ [[ϕ]]M , by defini-
tion, S(ω′) /∈ R(k−1) (since ϕ ∈ I(k−1)). By the inductive hypothesis, it follows
that S(ω′) ∪ {EBk−1RAT} is not satisfiable, so in particular ω′ 6|= EBk−1RAT .
We have therefore shown that [[ϕ]]M ∩ [[EBk−1RAT ]]M = ∅, from which we
can conclude that PRi(ω)([[EBk−1RAT ]]M) < 1, contradicting the fact that
ω |= EBkRAT .
In light of Lemma 4.3.2, Lemma A.0.2 implies that for each k ∈ N, R(k) 6= ∅.
Therefore the collection {R(k) : k ∈ N} does indeed have the finite intersection
property, hence
R∞ :=
∞⋂
k=0
R(k) 6= ∅.
The following lemma therefore clinches the main result.
Lemma A.0.3: S ∈ R∞ if and only if S ∪ {CB(RAT )} is satisfiable.
Proof: One direction is easy: if S ∪ {CB(RAT )} is satisfiable, then for every k ∈
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N we know that S ∪ {EBk(RAT )} is satisfiable. Lemma A.0.2 then guarantees
that
S ∈
⋂
k∈N
R(k) = R∞,
as desired.
Now we prove the converse. Suppose that R∞ 6= ∅; for each S ∈ R∞, let
MS = (ΩS, (sSi )i∈N , (PRS)i∈N) be a Γ structure with a distinguished state ωS ∈
ΩS such that ωS |= S ∪ {RAT}. This is always possible because S ∈ R∞ ⊆ R.
Let
Ω˜ =
⊔
S∈R∞
(ΩS ×N),
and equip this set with the σ-algebra of measurable sets generated by all sets of
the form ⊔
S∈R∞, i∈N
ES,i,
where ES,i is a measurable subset of ΩS × {i}. For i ∈ N and (ω, k) ∈ ΩS × N ,
set s˜i(ω, k) = sSi (ω) and define
P˜Ri(ω, k) =
 PR
S′
i (ω
S′)  ΩS′ × {i} if i 6= k and S ′ := S(MS, ω) ∈ R∞
PRSi (ω)  ΩS × {i} otherwise,
where the symbol  in the above is simply used to indicate that the probability
measure given on the left is to be interpreted in the set given on the right via the
natural correspondence (so, for example, though PRSi (ω) is technically defined
over ΩS , we can interpret it instead as being defined over ΩS × {i} since this
space is isomorphic to ΩS).
It is straightforward (if tedious) to show that M˜ := (Ω˜, (s˜i)i∈N , (P˜Ri)i∈N) is
a Γ-structure, and moreover that it has the following property: for all formulas
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ϕ ∈ LB(ΦΓ) and every (ω, k) ∈ ΩS ×N ,
(M˜, (ω, k)) |= ϕ iff (MS, ω) |= ϕ.
In particular, for all k ∈ N and S ∈ R∞, (M˜, (ωS, k)) |= S. Thus, if we show
that (M˜, (ωS, k)) |= CB(RAT ) we will be done. For this it suffices to prove that
(M˜, (ωS, k)) |= EBm(RAT ) for all m ∈ N, which follows by induction, employ-
ing the following crucial fact about M˜ : for every S ∈ R∞, k ∈ N , and i ∈ N ,
P˜Ri(ωS, k)({(ω′, k′) ∈ Ω˜ : S(M˜, (ω′, k′)) ∈ R∞)}) = 1.
This, in turn, is a consequence of the fact that S(M˜, (ωS, k)) ∈ R∞, and therefore
P˜Ri(ωS, k) assigns probability 0 to each of the (countably many) formulas in
I∞ :=
⋃
I(m) which witness a situation not being inR∞.
Since R∞ is nonempty, by Lemma A.0.3 there is some situation S ∈ S such
that S∪{CB(RAT )} is satisfiable. Thus, the strategy profile (ρ1(S), . . . , ρn(S)) ∈
Σ is rationalizable, as desired.
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